Within-Industry Technological Specialization, Collective Action, and Trade Policy by Urbanski, Piotr
WITHIN-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGICAL SPECIALIZATION, COLLECTIVE
ACTION, AND TRADE POLICY
A Dissertation
by
PIOTR URBANSKI
Submitted to the Oﬃce of Graduate and Professional Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Chair of Committee, Quan Li
Committee Members, Elena McLean
Erica Owen
Kishore Gawande
Head of Department, William Clark
December 2014
Major Subject: Political Science
Copyright 2014 Piotr Urbanski
ABSTRACT
The development of newer and better technologies has reshaped economic mar-
kets and will continue to do so in the future. New technologies are widely recognized
as a driving force behind economic and political integration. The advent of newer,
cheaper telecommunication and transportation methods has eroded social, political
and economic barriers between countries. However, little is understood how techno-
logical progress has aﬀected market structures and political outcomes–particularly
outcomes related to the ﬂow of goods from foreign competitors. This dissertation
builds oﬀ prior work in many areas. I heavily borrow implications and assumptions
from theories of factor mobility, collective action, economies of scale, innovation
economics, and international trade. Factor mobility is an important determinant
of whether or not actors in my theory care about their smaller group (industry) or
their larger group (factor of production). I call the synthesis of these theories “within
industry specialization” for the purposes of this dissertation. I argue that ﬁxed costs
can be treated as industry speciﬁc factor mobility. My idea of within industry special-
ization is just another type of ﬁxed cost. To measure within industry specialization,
I borrow from the economics of innovation. The literature on innovation argues that
technological development makes new innovation increasingly harder, in both patents
and academia. This means that we can proxy the diﬃculty/complexity of a ﬁeld of
knowledge by the size of a team necessary to create an innovation as each individual
brings a small slice of the knowledge pie. The research question this dissertation ulti-
mately seeks to answer is “when facing foreign competition, why do some industries
receive trade protection while others do not?”
ii
DEDICATION
I dedicate this dissertation to every Ph.D student writing their dissertation. Ev-
ery ﬁeld requires an ever growing giant we must climb to create new knowledge.
While increasingly daunting, with time, hardwork, and good friends the climb is not
impossible.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
The development of newer and better technologies has reshaped economic mar-
kets and will continue to do so in the future. New technologies are widely recognized
as a driving force behind economic and political integration. The advent of newer,
cheaper telecommunication and transportation methods has eroded social, political
and economic barriers between countries. However, little is understood how techno-
logical progress has aﬀected market structures and political outcomes–particularly
outcomes related to the ﬂow of goods from foreign competitors.
Traditionally, the role of technology has been understood to take two forms.
First is to increase productivity/eﬃciency of producing goods.1 The second is the
reduction of physical barriers to globalization by reducing transaction/transportation
costs.2 Both of these roles increase globalization. Productivity gains increase indus-
try and ﬁrm competitiveness versus foreign competitors. While the reduction of
transportation and transaction costs increases the number of goods that are in eﬀect
tradable across borders that would not be otherwise due to these costs.
In this dissertation I propose a third eﬀect. Technological innovation changes
the market structure of speciﬁc industries and therefore, the political preferences
and motivation for political action. In fact, under certain conditions, technological
innovation increases an industry’s preference to lobby for protection.
Technological development can have disparate eﬀects on the structure of eco-
nomic markets through its eﬀects on factor mobility. Typically, technology is seen
as something that increases the mobility of capital and labor.3 However, I argue
1Krugman (1994), Grossman and Helpman (1991)
2Krugman (1991)
3Hiscox (2001)
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that technological innovation can also increase complexity of tasks necessitating in-
creased specialization of factors of production. Increased technological complexity,
labor for example, must specialize in skills and knowledge that is non-transferable
(i.e. industry speciﬁc).4
Building on prior technology and knowledge, new technologies will have important
eﬀects on the structure of industries. Not all industries are created equal; some
industries will develop at a more rapid rate while others stagnate (Klevorick et al.
1995; Nelson and Wolﬀ 1997). Not all technologies will have the same eﬀects either.
Some technologies increase factor mobility across industries while others, those that
have industry speciﬁc uses, decrease factor mobility. To get industry speciﬁc entry
and exit costs, I borrowed from the innovation literature to create a theory of within
industry specialization and operationalize patent team size as a measure of this
specialization. This not only yields a usable measurement, but oﬀers a theoretical
explanation as to the process behind the creation of specialization.
It has been argued that tariﬀs have decreased in importance with their decline
since 1950 (Nenci 2011). Their decline does not diminish the value of studying tariﬀs
in this dissertation. I am seeking to explain heterogeneous tariﬀs across industries
over a long period of time, starting at a time when tariﬀs were higher than today (or
the end of the dataset). While most tariﬀs have indeed reduced across all industries,
the rate of which they have declined varies. The rate of change in tariﬀs illumi-
nates the relative diﬀerences of political power between industries in their ability to
inﬂuence tariﬀ policy.
Additionally, Tariﬀs have become lower, but not necessarily less important. Tar-
iﬀs still aﬀect a number of important economic outcomes such as whether or not
an industry survives against foreign competition. If the world price of a good pro-
4Jones (2009
2
duced by an industry is above the world price, a tariﬀ that raises the price of a
foreign competitors goods would keep the industry alive. Tariﬀs are still relatively
high in certain sectors and are still a major barrier for developing countries ability
to participate in international trade (Hoekman and Nicita 2011). For example, the
agricultural tariﬀs in developed economies harm developing economies more than
other types of trade manipulation. Hoekman et al. (2004) estimate that reducing
agricultural tariﬀs by half would improve developing countries welfare by more than
reducing subsidies by half in developed economies. This is why much of the focus in
recent WTO negotiations focuses on lowering agricultural subsidies (Baldwin 2011,
pg. 31; Hoekman et al. 2004). Knowing how technological development and within
industry specialization contributes to the rise or fall of tariﬀs improves policy makers
understanding of domestic interests in future negotiations.
Two empirical observations of technology and protectionism are invariably true.
First, the world and especially the United States has become increasingly open to
international economic exchange. Second, technology has become more complex
over time. Arguably at an ever increasing rate. However, the rate of both is not
the same for every sector of the economy. Some industries have developed faster
than others. At the same time some sectors have liberalized slower than others. Are
the two trends related? Is there some plausible causal link between heterogenous
technological development? The theory I propose here shows that we already have
the foundations for explaining how technology and globalization interact. Building oﬀ
work in economics and political science on inter-industry factor mobility I argue that
heterogeneous growth in technology between industries determines the motivation of
actors to act politically in the interests of their respected industry.
This dissertation builds oﬀ prior work in many areas. To echo Jones (2009) who
cites Sir Isaac Newton when regarding the complexities of knowledge and need for
3
teams in innovation, I stand on the shoulder of these giants to synthesize this dis-
sertation. I heavily borrow implications and assumptions from theories of factor
mobility, collective action, economies of scale, innovation economics, and interna-
tional trade. Factor mobility is an important determinant of whether or not actors
in my theory care about their smaller group (industry) or their larger group (factor
of production). These are the same assumptions made by many prior researchers
trying to explain political coalitions over trade policy (Rogowski 1989, Hiscox 2001).
This ties very closely with work that argues that how narrow a group is (Gilli-
gan 1997) and the particularism of electoral institutions (Kono 2009) are important
determinants of actors to overcome collective action problems and receive their pre-
ferred trade policy outcome. How “narrow” a group is was determined as the level
of intra-industry trade by both Gilligan and Kono. The more diversiﬁed the prod-
ucts, the more narrow an actors interests. So narrow in fact, that actors only care
about policy that aﬀects one speciﬁc product only they produce. I borrow from
economics the theories behind economies of scale and ﬁxed costs to both explain
why intra-industry trade has this eﬀect and motivate my theoretical contribution of
within industry specialization. Simply put, ﬁxed costs change market structures to
encourage diversiﬁcation of product varieties and, therefore, increase intra-industry
trade (Krugman 1994). I argue that ﬁxed costs can be treated as industry speciﬁc
factor mobility. And my idea of within industry specialization is just another type of
ﬁxed cost. To measure within industry specialization, I borrow from Jones’ (2009)
and his various other work on the economics of innovation. Jones argues that tech-
nological development makes new innovation increasingly harder, in both patents
and academia.5 This means that we can proxy the diﬃculty/complexity of a ﬁeld of
5Jones has so far only analyzed patents and academic papers. I believe his theory would apply
to other types of group creative activities.
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knowledge by the size of a team necessary to create an innovation.
Prior work has examined a number of aspects important to my theory. For
example, a lot of work has been done on factor mobility in international political
economy (Hiscox 2001; Mukherjee et al. 2009) and a similar related concept called
asset speciﬁcity in comparative politics (Iversen and Soskice 2001). Often the two
literatures are at odds when attempting to explain welfare state spending (Rehm
2009). However, both are important contributions to understanding the ability of
an individual factor of production to move from one job to another. The IPE work
focuses on mobility between industries while the comparative politics work focuses on
mobility between professions. The latter improves on the former by allowing mobility
to vary at more micro- levels. The former, IPE, work has only been able to examine
the eﬀect of economy-wide factor mobility with variation only by country and time
(See for example, Hiscox 2001). This dissertation, therefore, contributes to the extant
literature on trade policy by allowing factor mobility to vary by industry. Only one
paper to my knowledge has touched how industry varying mobility inﬂuences policy
outcomes, albeit with a limited scope (Alt et al. 1999).
I employ the aforementioned theories with economic models of international trade
to derive preferences over trade policy. To do so, my theory is a synthesis of “new
trade theory” (See Krugman 1980; Balassa 1967; Grubel 1970; Kravis 1971; Gross-
man and Helpman 2002) and classical trade models such as Heckscher-Ohlin and
Ricardo-Viner. The link between the two is industry level ﬁxed costs as measured
by within industry specialization. The higher the within industry specialization,
the closer preferences align with Ricardo-Viner predictions. That is, industry mem-
bership matters for determining who wins and loses–i.e. who prefers protection, and
who prefers free trade (Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933; Samuelson 1948; Rogowski 1989;
Hiscox 2001). This combined with my argument that within industry specialization
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also helps industry actors to overcome collective action problems, I derive a set of
conditional hypotheses summarized in Chapter 2 and test these in Chapter 3 and 4.
The research question this dissertation ultimately seeks to answer is “when facing
foreign competition, why do some industries receive trade protection while others do
not?” The next section outlines my proposed method of attack to answering this
question. The goal is that by answering this question I also illuminate the broader
theoretical connections of technological progress on market structures, motivations
for collective action, and political outcomes.
1.2 Outline of the Dissertation
The rest of this dissertation is organized into four chapters. In Chapter 2, I
present the theoretical logic to behind my hypothesis. I propose a theory of within
industry specialization which hinges on a new little understood aspect of technologi-
cal development. That is, technological development not only increases the depth of
knowledge, but also the breadth. The theoretical implications from within industry
specialization are similar as those from economies of scale. The larger the entry and
exit barriers are for a particular industry, the more industry membership matters
over other considerations such as factor ownership.
I operationalize within industry specialization as industry-year average patent
team size. This measure is employed in the innovation economics literature to mea-
sure the complexity of knowledge required to create new innovations.6 The larger
the team, the less each individual must be bringing to the table. Therefore, the ﬁeld
of knowledge must be more complex which necessitates specialization by the factors
of production employed in that industry.
I tie this with the logic of collective action and classical trade models to de-
6See Jones (2009). Also Wuchty et al. (2007); Jones et al. 2007.
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rive an industry’s ability and intensity of lobbying over trade policy. The proposed
theory helps us understand why certain industries are able to overcome collective
action problems to lobbying and successfully receive the trade policy outcomes they
prefer. A number of conditional hypotheses are derived interacting within industry
specialization and exposure to foreign competition.
Tackling the challenge of testing the predictions of within industry specializa-
tion requires two stages with two empirical tests. The natural starting point is to
examine whether or not within industry specialization aﬀects collective action behav-
ior. Chapter 3 tests the conditional hypotheses on the intensity of lobbying eﬀorts.
Utilizing the data of U.S. patent team sizes, I test the idea that within industry spe-
cialization increases industry cohesiveness and intensity to act on an issue. That is,
increased specialization leads to greater lobbying eﬀorts by the industry as a whole
as actors are “stuck” within that industry. Chapter 4 tests the second stage of my
theory–that within industry specialization inﬂuences an industry’s ability to receive
a beneﬁcial trade policy outcome.
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation with a summary of how the dissertation
contributes the extant literature on industries and trade policy. Particularly, I focus
on why it is important to study an industry’s entry and exit costs to determine the
ability of an industry to act as a cohesive political force (overcome collective action
problems) and the intensity of that industry’s preference. A number of limitations
are also discussed with possibilities for future research.
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2. OVERCOMING COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS: WITHIN-INDUSTRY
SPECIALIZATION, LOBBYING EFFORTS, AND TRADE BARRIERS
Throughout history technological innovation has created new industries and re-
shaped old ones. The creation of new ideas, production methods, and technologies
has created winners and losers. Particularly, in labor markets where individuals
invest in skills relevant to these newly created technologies.1 At the same time, tech-
nology has helped shape and been shaped by increasing globalization in a mutually
reinforcing fashion.2 The eﬀects of these forces on political preferences, powers, and
outcomes are understudied and little understood.
As the world has become increasingly globalized, technology has continued to de-
velop. Arguably at an ever increasing rate. However, some industries have developed
faster than others. At the same time some sectors of the American economy have lib-
eralized more or less. Are the two trends related? Is there some plausible causal link
between heterogenous technological development? The theory I propose here shows
that we already have the foundations for explaining how technology and globalization
interact. Building oﬀ work in economics and political science on inter-industry factor
mobility I argue that heterogeneous growth in technology between industries deter-
mines the motivation of actors to act politically in the interests of their respected
industry. Researchers recognize the need to study inter-industry factor mobility as
an important determinant of how an actor’s preferences align. However, present re-
search treats the factor mobility of individual industries as homogenous throughout
a whole economy, albeit changing through time and across countries. But not across
industries.
1Acemoglu (2002)
2Aggarwal (1999)
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For example, building oﬀ earlier work by Rogowski (1989), which examined polit-
ical cleavages given a country’s factor endowment ratios, Hiscox (2001) allows factor
mobility to vary across time and countries. His arguments that a country with high
mobility will reﬂect class-wide cleavages and those countries with low mobility will
reﬂect industry cleavages draw directly from trade models employed by economists
to predict patterns of trade. I examine these models in more detail in section 2.1.
Most researchers opt to either assume away mobility by assuming its high (Milner
and Kubota 2005), or let the data speak for itself by looking at whether or not in-
dustry or class characteristics are signiﬁcant (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; O’Rourke
et al. 2001; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Imai and Tingley 2012).3 Mukherjee et al.
(2009) and unpublished work by Hiscox and Rickard (2002) do allow factor mobility
to vary across countries and time. However, all this work has not allowed factor
mobility, in terms of the ability of being able to enter or exit an industry to vary
by industries themselves. That is, they assume that there is one single homogenous
level of factor mobility for all sectors of an entire economy. Other authors look at
the level labor skill generalizability to other industries but with the implication that
less generalizable skills lead to higher perceptions of risk. Not in the context of trade
policy coalitions and preferences as examined here. This literature is examined in
Section 2.3 for its potential use in this dissertation and its limitations.
Unpacking homogenous inter-industry factor mobility to industry speciﬁc factor
mobility can help us understand why when facing foreign competition, do some
industries receive protection from governments while others do not? Consider the
following two real world examples. Since the 1990s, the textile industry in the United
States is its death throes from increasing foreign competition. The U.S. automobile
3This is commonly used also in the compensation hypothesis literature to theorize about who
beneﬁts and, therefore, wants compensation policies. See for example Walter (2010)
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industry faced similar diﬃculties in early 1980s and the late 2000s, but has for now
survived due to negotiated voluntary export restraints and government bailouts.
Both industries at one point were highly competitive and proﬁtable but time and
technology transfer eroded away their competitive advantage. Facing stiﬀ foreign
competition, why was the textile industry allowed to die out and the automobile
industry was not?
The reason one was protected and the other was not cannot simply be to protect
jobs. The textile industry employed about 700 thousand individuals in 19904 and
about 400 thousand in 2008.5 While the automobile industry employed about 830
thousand in 1990 and about 600 thousand in 2008.6 Both industries employ relatively
large labor forces.
Additionally, it cannot be the lack of productivity or technological improvement.
The automobile industry lagged behind its foreign competition and received a bailout
estimated to have been around 80 billion dollars in 2008. Many experts agree that
this bailout has had a positive eﬀect on the industry’s competitiveness evidenced
by increased sales and the rapid payback of the industry loans to the government.7
The textile industry could have also lobbied for government intervention such as
trade barriers or bailouts just as the automobile industry did in 2008. In 1969, it
was estimated that the textile industry could increase its productivity by investing
more than $5 billion dollars, approximately $30 billion 2008 dollars,8 less than half
of the auto bailout. Given that both industries had a lot at stake and motivation for
preferring some type of government intervention, why was the textile industry allowed
4Mittelhauser (1997)
5National Council of Textile Organizations (http://www.ncto.org/industryemployment/index.asp).
6U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/)
7Hicken (2013)
8Given in a speech by John P. Figh of Chase Manhattan Bank to the American Textile Institute.
Cited from Mittelhauser (1997).
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to die oﬀ? I argue that while both industries will prefer government intervention such
as trade protection, it is insuﬃcient to just look at the preferences of various economic
actors but also the ability of these actors to overcome collective action problems (Alt
and Gilligan 1994).
The answer lies with how “stuck” an actor within a particular industry, that is,
the factor mobility. This determines the potential losses due to having to readjust
to another industry if yours goes under from foreign competition. If an actor can
move to another industry and make the same amount of money, why care about the
industry? In this dissertation, inter-industry factor mobility can be thought of as
the adjustment costs necessary to be paid in order to switch industries. These costs
come in two ﬂavors, costs of entry and costs of exit.
The textile and auto industry are used because what I am truly explaining is
government policy that favors a particular industry. The empirical chapters will
examine actual lobbying for policy and tariﬀs. Tariﬀs are just one possible policy that
favors an industry as a whole. Both textiles and the auto industry faced competition
from foreign manufacturers a number of times in their long histories. This means
that they both could have been motivated to lobby the government to do something
about it. The choice of policy is not important. The fact that they could or could
not get some policy concession is important. I focus on tariﬀs empirically because it
is the most readily available data to test the theory. I focus on other policies (e.g.
bailout) in the qualitative discussion to show that it is not tariﬀ I am explaining but
favorable policy that the industry itself lobbied for. The interesting question is why
did industry X get a policy while industry Y did not get a policy. Maybe in this
speciﬁc example, policy diﬀerences and industry idiosyncrasies matter a lot more than
my idea of within industry specialization. This is why I will be explaining the same
examples based on tariﬀs, lobbing, and within industry specialization throughout
11
this dissertation as well. Then generalize even more to empirical hypotheses and
tests for all industries.
2.1 Homogenous Factor Mobility
While it is true that both industries want trade protection, the potential losses
for the automobile industry may have been higher. One might argue then that these
higher potential losses made the automobile industry “lobby harder” for government
intervention. However, I argue that this is not necessarily the case. Whether or not
factors of production in the automobile industry face any losses depends on their
mobility, or readjustment cost, to another industry. If, for example, automobile
factories, machines, and skills are easily and cheaply transferred to the production
of goods in another proﬁtable industry then the desire to protect the automobile
industry is lower. Why would a factor of production care about an industry’s proﬁts
if it can be easily reemployed elsewhere producing the same proﬁts?
I argue that the factors of production in the automobile industry did not face
cheap and easy adjustment. One reason the automobile industry is proﬁtable is due
to high start-up costs of entry into the industry. This protects the industry from an
inﬂux of competitors but also allows gains due to production at very large volumes.
This creates industry speciﬁc proﬁts that exist only for those actors employed in that
industry. Exiting, therefore, is additionally costly as those industry speciﬁc beneﬁts
disappear.
In order for there to be anything “speciﬁc” to industry speciﬁc production, the
factors of production must exhibit some level of specialized production techniques
and knowledge. Otherwise these techniques and knowledge would spill-over to other
industries equalizing their proﬁts. It is safe to assume then that the factors of pro-
duction employed in the automobile industry exhibit higher levels of automobile
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industry speciﬁc uses. It is true then, that for these factors of production losses
would be high due to exit, but it need not be the case. If these factors of production,
faced losses due to foreign competition, they would only care about the automobile
industry as an important distinction for themselves, if they can only be employed in
the automobile industry. If automobile factors of production can move to any other
manufacturing industry, they will not care about automobiles as much as manufac-
turing as a whole. This implies that at diﬀerent levels of disaggregation of what is an
“industry” matters when determining preferences over policy outcomes. The second
implication is that the level of mobility that we look at, should match this level of
aggregation, otherwise we are making the wrong predictions.
If we use a single economy wide measurement of mobility we can only determine
industry vs. class cleavages such as Hiscox’s (2001) work. However, we cannot
tell, what cleavages would exist in ﬁner grained disaggregation of the economy, such
as a speciﬁc industry. The same applies within sub-industries within higher level
industry classiﬁcations. Consider a measurement of mobility for the manufacturing
sector and the agricultural sector. We can only tell if manufacturing, overall, is
high or low relative to agricultural. From this measurement we cannot tell if the
eﬀect of mobility on automobile manufacturing sub-industry has the same eﬀect on
the motivations as, say, computer processor manufacturing sub-industry. We need
variation, therefore, we need a distinct measurement of both.
Industries are not homogenous; this fact is what distinguishes them as distinct
industries to begin with. However, as mentioned in the previous section, some au-
thors either assume complete mobility or immobility to use a particular trade model;
and other authors let the data tell them. When authors utilize inter-industry fac-
tor mobility in their theories, they conceptualize mobility as the ease of adjustment
from one industry into any other industry as a single cross-industry measurement
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(See Frieden 1991; Alt and Gilligan 1994; Gilligan 1997; Hiscox 2001, 2002; Hiscox
and Rickard 2002; Mukherjee et al. 2009). This is because they derive their theories
from the oft cited Hecksher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner theories of trade which assume
either completely mobile factors of production or completely speciﬁc respectively.
2.1.1 Hecksher-Ohlin Model – Completely Mobile
Commonly, to derive trade preferences of actors, researchers utilize the distribu-
tional predictions of the aforementioned workhorse models of trade. The Heckscher-
Ohlin (HO) model of trade assumes that factors of production are completely mobile
within a domestic economy. That is, factors can be costlessly converted from use
in one industry to another but are immobile across countries. The original model
assumed a “2x2x2” framework (read two by two by two) with two countries, two
goods and two factors. Additionally, derived from the HO model, researchers utilize
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (1941). The theorem states that international trade
increases real returns for a domestically abundant factor (abundant relative to the
rest of the world), international trade decreases returns for factors that are scarce
relative to the rest of the world. Factors gain and lose due to the factor price equal-
ization theorem. Because factors of production are immobile across countries, trade
is a substitute for cross country mobility. As goods are traded between countries,
market forces of supply and demand will equalize the prices of these goods over time.
As proﬁts or returns to factors of production are tied to the prices of the goods they
are used to produce, some factors “win” and some “lose.”9
The key theoretical insight from the Heckscher-Ohlin/Stolper-Samuelson frame-
work is the factor price equalization that occurs when factors are mobile across
industries. If an industry has higher than average income, competitors from another
9For the earliest foundational work, see Heckscher (1919), Ohlin (1933) and Samuelson (1947).
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industry will see this and move to this industry equalizing prices between two in-
dustries. For economic actors, in this case factors of production, the industry they
are employed does not matter for their returns. Just whether or not they are the
beneﬁting factor of production. A well-studied implication is the eﬀect of political
cleavages between high-skilled and low-skilled labor in the United States (Scheve
and Slaughter 2001). In the United States, for example, high-skilled labor (labor
combined with “capital” in the form of human capital) is relatively abundant com-
pared to the rest of the world and low-skilled labor is relatively scarce. Therefore,
scholars predict that in the United States, high-skilled labor wins from free trade,
while low-skilled labor loses.10 We can, therefore, expect that an actor that can
easily and cheaply adjust to employment to another industry will not be particularly
motivated towards protecting the speciﬁc industry they are employed in. That is,
there is nothing uniquely beneﬁcial towards being in one industry or another.
2.1.2 Ricardo-Viner Model – Completely Immobile
The Ricardo-Viner (RV) model begins with the same underlying economic model
of trade as Hecksher-Ohlin but assumes factors of production are “speciﬁc” or immo-
bile between industries (Samuelson 1948; Mussa 1982). Factors used in production
in one industry cannot be transferred to use in another industry. The economic
proﬁts gained from factors of production are, therefore, tied to the industry in which
it is employed. In an open economy, industries (and ﬁrms) that are able to ex-
port due to a competitive advantage (export-oriented) receive an increase in real
returns, while those employed in industries unable to compete with their foreign
counterparts (import-competing) decreased returns. Under the RV model’s predic-
10Milner and Kubota (2005) extend this model to the developing country case to argue how
democratization in developing countries causes trade liberalization by revealing the preferences of
low-skilled labor. In the developing country case, low-skilled labor is abundant and prefers free
trade.
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tions, political cleavages will form between those who gain and those who lose from
trade. Import-competing industries will prefer protectionism while those employed
in export-oriented industries will prefer free trade.
These two neoclassical trade models are typically treated as polar opposites and
treated studied assuming full mobility or no mobility. Studies assume that either
the economy at a given time exists completely as a HO type or RV type and seeks
to test implications given one or the other (See Milner and Kubota 2005, Baker
2005, Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Mayda and Rodrik 2005, Mayer 1974). Others
have allowed mobility to vary continuously from one extreme to the other (Hiscox
2001, 2002; Ladewig 2006; Mukherjee et al. 2009). The two models are potentially
both true where the HO model considered the long-run model and RV being the
short-run model. The logic is, that most if not all factors of production given enough
time and costs can be repurposed for other industries (Mayer 1974; Neary 1978).11
These studies, however, ignore that industries are heterogeneous on many important
factors, including factor mobility. While a homogenous economy wide level of factor
mobility has been successful in explaining many aspects about trade policy, it does
not tell us much about industry speciﬁc preferences and outcomes as it does not vary
from industry to industry.
2.2 Heterogeneous Factor Mobility
Factor mobility can be characterized as the adjustment costs a factor of produc-
tion must face when entering or exiting an industry in order to be used for other
purposes elsewhere. Given the heterogeneous nature of production, each industry
potentially has its own entry and exit costs. If this is true, the Heckscher-Ohlin and
Ricardo-Viner models are not precise enough for predicting political preferences of
11For an application of long-run vs short-run dynamics in trade policy preferences see Mayda and
Rodrik (2005).
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economic actors. These models only oﬀer predictions based on economy-wide average
entry and exit costs. Because these models assume a single estimate of mobility at a
given cross-section of the world. Allowing for more disaggregated mobility may help
explain the lack of, or weak empirical evidence for either of the two models in recent
empirical work highlighted by Mansﬁeld and Mutz (2009). These two authors instead
focus on various social-psychological factors (e.g. out-group anxieties, ideology) and
sociotropic (caring about the whole economy, and the condition of others) versus the
egotropic (caring about one’s own economic wellbeing) predictions of trade models.
I choose the industry as the level of analysis to explain protectionism for two
reasons. First is that there have been diﬀering rates of protectionism across diﬀerent
industries. The second is that I believe much can be explained based on the logic
of collective action. For collective action to occur you naturally need to examine a
group of actors with the potential to work together. The industry is such a group of
economic actors (ﬁrms and their employees) that produce goods considered similar
enough to share a common interest in trade policy. The ﬁrms and employees them-
selves could be examined. The latter of which was done by Busch and Reinhardt
(2002). However, I believe analyzing the industry is more relevant and interesting to
testing theories of collective action of groups. It is easy to believe a ﬁrm or employee
would act in their self-interest. It is much more diﬃcult to believe that a whole group
of ﬁrms and employees could come together eﬀectively to lobby for a greater good.
This dissertation seeks to determine the factors that inﬂuence the ability of these
actors to actually do so. Alternatively, factor owners of land, labor or capital could
be examined as a common group following a Heckscher-Ohlin framework to draw on
theoretical predictions. For the purposes of this dissertation, I stick to examining the
implications of collective action theories on the industry and hinge my theoretical
predictions on intra-industry trade and Ricardo-Viner models.
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Under the neoclassical models, factor mobility is assumed to be equal from any
industry into any other industry. For a simple example economy such as in Figure 2.1,
assume there are three industries or sectors of production, A, B, and C. Let δi denote
the cost of moving between industries (immobility), equals either 0 or 1 and where
i = A,B,C. Let 0 represent “costless mobility” and 1 represent “perfect immobility.”
Therefore, in the Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner models, δA = δB = δC and all
equal either 0 or 1 for perfect extremes of HO and RV respectively. Alternatively, and
probably more realistically, readjustment costs range between 0 and 1 and vary over
time and space given certain technological, geographic, and/or political factors.12
Figure 2.1: Heterogenous Industry Mobility
However, is it reasonable to assume that an industry with low adjustment costs
12See for example Hiscox 2001 and Mukherjee et al. 2009
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will behave politically the same as one requiring high adjustment costs? Averaging
adjustment costs across all sectors like a single homogenous measure of inter-industry
factor mobility does not vary across industries. Therefore, it does not tell us anything
about industry diﬀerences.
2.2.1 Economies of Scale and Fixed Costs to Entry
There are costs associated with industry entry. Bain (1956) deﬁned barriers to
entry as “an advantage of established sellers in an industry over potential entrant
sellers, which is reﬂected in the extent to which established sellers can persistently
raise their prices above competitive levels without attracting new ﬁrms to enter the
industry.”13 I extend this deﬁnition to also include the entry of labor as well. The
logic is that there exists some cost a new entrant must pay in order to participate
in an industry. For a ﬁrm, this may take the form of ﬁxed costs of investment
due to economies of scale. Industries characterized by economies of scale require a
ﬁrm to produce at very high volumes to be proﬁtable. Therefore, a new potential
ﬁrm must invest in enough factories, machines, and labor to be able to produce at
a large scale. The same can be said of labor. An individual laborer must invest in
speciﬁc knowledge and skills through education, training, and job experience in order
to participate in a particular industry. These are the same investments in human
capital that create potential future exit costs.
The proﬁtability of ﬁrms also depends on the level of their industry entry barriers
(Bain 1956; Scherer 1970; Caves and Porter 1977; Porter 1979) and the persistence of
non-competitive rents for ﬁrms varies between industries (Waring 1996). The wages
of similar workers as well as ﬁrm returns can vary signiﬁcantly across industries
13Models of industry heterogeneity and trade policy, “new trade theory,” are based on these same
arguments of economies of scale and ﬁxed costs (Krugman 1980). See also, Balassa (1965); Grubel
(1970); Kravis (1971), Grossman and Helpman (2002), Milner (1997).
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with industry membership accounting from seven to thirty percent this variation
(Schmalansee 1985; Wernerfelt and Montgomery 1988; Rumelt 1991; Powell 1996).14
This means that there are still unobserved heterogeneities between industries that
are uncontrolled for. The mere fact of being employed speciﬁc industry (ﬁxed eﬀect)
accounts for at the very least, seven percent of income, controlling for all other
determinants of wages such as industry average education and industry proﬁtability.
This can be interpreted that for some, there are additional non-competitive rents (or
losses) attributed from being employed in an industry outside the beneﬁts attributed
to one’s own education or productivity. I argue that one of these unobserved industry
heterogeneities is industry speciﬁc entry and exit costs above the standard barriers
to entry already considered in prior research.
While “natural” economic entry barriers may protect ﬁrms’ ability to extract
above competitive rate returns, competition from foreign manufacturers can under-
mine this natural barrier to entry. Many ﬁrms gained these advantages by being
the ﬁrst-mover into the industry when costs of entry were lower. New foreign pro-
ducers pose a threat because they also entered the industry when costs were low in
their respective country. Once they became competitive enough to export, they pose
a threat to established domestic producers. Therefore, even industries with high
barriers to entry will lobby harder for protection of these industry speciﬁc rents.
Gilligan (1997) makes this same argument about industries characterized by high
levels of intra-industry trade. Firms within such industries are monopolists of their
own speciﬁc good. In turn, trade policy applied to them is a private beneﬁt from
which they can exclude others. While Gilligan focuses on the intra-industry trade
and product variety aspects of his argument, his theory actually hinges on large
economies of scale (pg. 549). The theoretical implication drawn here highlights
14For a comprehensive survey see Groshen (1991).
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that high ﬁxed costs are associated with scale economies. Economies of scale create
potential for industries characterized by high intra-industry trade and motivation
for political action. It is not, as Gillian argues, that intra-industry trade motivates
collective action. It is the classic endogenous variable problem. Fixed costs cause
intra-industry trade and motivation for collective action, not that intra-industry
trade causes motivation for collective action. The same argument can be made of
Busch and Reinhardt (2000), who ﬁnd that the geographic concentration, that is
how geographically proximate ﬁrms are to one another within an industry, of an
industry strongly increases lobbing contributions. For example, Krugman (1991)
shows that industries characterized by high ﬁxed costs of production interact with
transportation costs to motivate ﬁrms to move geographically closer together to gain
cost advantages. Fixed costs of production encourage ﬁrms to produce in a single
location, high transportation costs encourage ﬁrms to produce near large markets.
This eﬀect, with the added coincidence that transportation costs were high during the
industrialization period of the United States, manufacturing is highly geographically
concentrated.15 Again, ﬁxed costs cause geographic concentration and motivation for
political action and not that geographic concentration causes motivation for political
action.
2.2.2 Sunk Costs, Industry Speciﬁc Non-Competitive Rents as Exit Costs
There are also costs associated with industry exit. These come in two forms, sunk
costs and industry speciﬁc non-competitive rents associated with the aforementioned
entry costs. Sunk costs come from the initial investment to enter an industry (ﬁxed
cost) from investment (industry speciﬁc physical capital) and human capital (indus-
try speciﬁc skills an knowledge). For labor, these costs and be particularly high.
15See Hanson 2001 for a review.
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We also know that there exist industry speciﬁc income for ﬁrms (mentioned above)
and labor. Once an individual laborer is displaced from one job and is reemployed
in another, their wages are lower and the amount of specialized human capital they
have gained in their tenure in the previous industry increases the amount of wages
lost (Topel 1990). Workers that change industries when re-employing tend to lose
higher portions of their pre-displacement wage (Jacobson et al. 1993) and that those
loses too are greater the longer an individual was in their original industry (Neal
1995). This suggests that there is a wage premium for industry speciﬁc knowledge
on top of general human capital accumulation or that the wage premium arose from
non-competitive rents due to formerly high barriers to entry.
As Alt et al. (1996) put it, this income premium is what is at “stake” to be
lost when competitors crowd into the industry. The greater the stakes, the greater
the potential for collective action. Prospect theory also comes into play because
individuals highly value potential losses, increasing the stakes even more (Levy 2003;
Tversky and Kahneman 1986). Given this, actors stuck within a particular industry
due to high exit costs will be more motivated to act to protect their industry.
2.3 Prior Measurements
A few questions remain. How do we measure industry speciﬁc entry and exit
costs? And where do industry speciﬁc entry and exit costs come from? For the
former question, I believe the best approach is to think of entry and exit costs as
a combination of ﬁxed costs and potential losses due to exit. In many ways as
mentioned above, these are two sides of the same coin. A good measurement should
be able to capture these two aspects simultaneously and while also having variations
across industries.
Most research approaches the issue of mobility from an economy wide unit of
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analysis, with variation in either (or both) between countries or across time. Many
researchers have approached the issue by leveraging industry and profession clas-
siﬁcation schemes to measure labor skill transferability. I propose instead to look
at ﬁxed costs. Not just any ﬁxed cost but a new form I term “within industry
specialization.”
2.3.1 Classiﬁcation Scheme Approach
There are a number of ways in which more disaggregated mobility has been at-
tempted to be measured. These tend to look only at labor mobility and not factor
mobility more broadly. First, in the comparative politics literature, Iversen and Sos-
kice (2001) build their “Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences.” They argue that
individuals with less portable skills (speciﬁc skills/assets) face higher market risks
and prefer higher levels of social spending as a safety net. However, Iversen and
Soskice’s, henceforth I&S, measure is actually a measure of profession specialization
not industry specialization because it is derived from the hierarchical structure of
the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations (ISCO-88) which is a classi-
ﬁcation scheme of occupations or professions, not industries.16 While ISCO-88 does
incorporate industry diﬀerences among individual professions, the hierarchy used by
I&S to create skill speciﬁcity masks these industrial diﬀerences. For example, the
broader classiﬁcation of “Machine-operator” has a staggering 480 sub-categories such
as ammunition products, drying/laundry, sewing/garments and tire production. It is
16This fact is actually noted by the International Labor Organization (ILO) on their website: “For
some workers it will therefore be possible to ‘predict’ the occupation in which they are working with
a fairly high degree of success, knowing how they are classiﬁed by industry. This does not mean that
ISCO-88 is using industry as a classiﬁcation criterion (except in a few cases where it is directly
relevant), only that skills in fact are linked to products, materials, etc. which are the determinants
of the industry of the establishment in which the work is carried out. The conceptual diﬀerence
between the two types of classiﬁcations should not be forgotten, even though it may be partly
obscured by the correlation between them and by the terminology used.” Emphasis mine. See
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco88/anc3.htm.
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easy to identify from this the industry the professions belong to–military industrial,
dry cleaning (non-tradable), textiles and automobile. I&S’s measure assumes all of
these professions are of relatively homogenous skills. While this is plausible and
useful for many analyses, it does nothing to tell us about industry speciﬁc entry and
exit, and the potential rents derived thereof. Additionally, the conclusions of I&S’s
approach, and the whole body of research spun oﬀ since, is that higher skill speci-
ﬁcity increases risks. This argument is congruent with the one argued here, except
I argue increased specialization comes from industry speciﬁc skills and knowledge.
Economic actors want to protect their industry speciﬁc rents, not their profession,
at least when it comes to trade politics.
Second, an industry based measure has been adopted utilizing the same logic as
I&S but based on the hierarchy of industrial classiﬁcations versus professions. For
example, Elliot and Lindley (2006) use a three tiered classiﬁcation scheme where
a move from education to manufacturing is an inter-sectoral move. While a move
within manufacturing from textiles to furniture is an inter-industry move. And a
move from textile weaving to preparation and spinning of textile ﬁbers is an intra-
industry move. Where the I&S model lacked industry considerations, the industry
classiﬁcation scheme lacks profession considerations. For example, a janitor working
in an automobile plant that goes out of business due to foreign competition can easily
ﬁnd a job in a high school.
Both profession and industry classiﬁcation schemes do a good job at yielding the
empirical expectations the respective theoretical schools they come from. Neither
directly tackles other factors of production besides labor. While imperfect, they
both have one thing in common, that there is an element of specialization of skills
and knowledge required for jobs and that this has important eﬀects on determining
the motivations of industry actors.
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No classiﬁcation scheme, however, proposes where the need for specialization
comes from. That is, why is it that the same profession requires more training or
knowledge in one industry than another? The answer is simply the inherent nature
of the job or industry. There is something inherent in consumer electronics (vs.
textiles) that allows for greater potential in not just technological development but
breadth. In the next section I will propose a theory based the inherent nature of
some tasks, ﬁelds of knowledge/technology and production techniques that leads to
heterogeneous breadth of technology. By breadth, I mean that there is greater need
and potential for specialization of labor and production techniques. In particular, I
explain where specialization comes from and how to measure this abstract “inherent
nature.” Admittedly, the theory does a better job at explaining the motivations of
an accountant in the ﬁnancial sector potentially switching to an accountant in the
airline industry than a janitor switching to an accountant. The latter however, well
explained by existing theories of increasing human capital versus industry speciﬁc
knowledge. Additionally, the goal is to explain how inter-industry adjustment in-
ﬂuences political preferences of labor as well as capital, which a profession based
approach cannot do.
2.4 New Proposed Measurement
2.4.1 Within Industry Specialization
How do diﬀerences of industry speciﬁc adjustment costs arise? How can we
measure an abstract idea that there is “something inherent” in an industry that
necessitates the specialization of knowledge and methods of production? Tracing
the history of a technology can be thought of a linear process from simply from
old to new. Consider, for example, the development of storage media. Modern
technologies based on magnetic (Audio Cassette, Floppy Disk, Hard Disk Platter),
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optical (CDs, DVDs, Blu-Ray), and solid state (Flash Drives) technologies can be
traced back to the same basic logic used in earlier storage mediums. Physical media
such as punch cards were invented by Basile Bouchon a textile worker and utilized
holes punched into cards in special arrangements to store patterns used by automatic
looms. Later in 1890, prior to founding Industrial Business Machines (IBM), Herman
Hollerith revolutionized the U.S Census by using punch cards to store and collect
data on individuals. He cut the time to compile census information from 8 years to
1 year. The same logic, storing information as a hole or no hole, percolated through
newer and newer technologies such as the phonograph (Thomas Edison 1877) and
optical compact discs (David Paul Gregg 1962). The most modern widely utilized
storage media is the solid state drive, which utilizes special substances and electrical
signals to store information in electric charges representing the states of on or oﬀ.
Whether a tape, spiral, or grid, the same logic behind storing information links
all these technologies–storing information essentially in 0s and 1s arranged in some
standardized pattern.
One way of analyzing this development would be a linear time line, choosing
an arbitrary starting point such as punch cards and ending with solid state drives.
Reference the line for depth from old (punch cards) to new (solid state drives) in
Figure 2.2. Each successive technology oﬀering some improvement over the last. The
body of knowledge storage media technology can have a lot of depth, or stock, in
knowledge. A rich history of successive, often incremental, improvements over old
technology. Theories utilizing technological development illustrate the process as a
one-dimensional forward progression from one level of technology to new more ad-
vanced level of technology. Technology takes form as a mechanism that increases
eﬃciency and factor productivity (Posner 1961; Vernon 1966) and decreases trans-
portation costs (Taylor 1951). Investment in technology in the form of Research and
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Development (R&D) is seen as a source of comparative advantage (Grossman and
Helpman 1991). Alternatively, technology has been characterized as a process which
creates new products. Where innovation is the process that creates new products
and technology transfer is the process by which new products are transformed into
old products. First movers of advanced economies gain monopoly rents as sole pro-
ducers of new technology products (Krugman 1979; Krugman 1994, pg. 144). Both
of these characterizations focus on the incremental nature of technology where newer
is better. Neither looks at how technological progress eﬀects the complexity of tasks
and knowledge within industries.
Figure 2.2: Depth and Breadth in Technology or Knowledge
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An additional way of analyzing the development of technology would be the
increasing complexity of the knowledge, inputs and production techniques required
to understand, produce and invent them. This would be the vertical line representing
breadth in Figure2.2. The combination of depth and breadth makes technological
progress into a triangle. With some arbitrary starting point at one end, and a
spread out wider end where the width represents a variety of technologies tracing
their history back to the original. Newer technology requires not only the knowledge
of its own direct history but the various other potentially relevant branches. If one
thinks of this as a ﬁeld of knowledge, or academia, we can think of these as oﬀshoots
of earlier more primal ﬁelds. As a scholar of international political economy, one
must not only know the relevant research in political science but also economics.
Back to the example of storage media, consider Long-play records (LPs) and op-
tical disks such as Compact Discs (CDs) which have many similarities. Both can
be used to record information physically on a spiral on a circular disk. While LPs
were rather complex in their day, the complexities involved pale in comparison when
you consider something more recent like optical discs. A CD requires the production
knowledge of speciﬁc plastics and metals, lenses and lasers, specialized software to
convert digital zeroes and ones to audio, and the speakers themselves. It’s not just
a matter of counting the number of technologies involved, but the nature and com-
plexity of the technologies themselves. Metals must be designed to store information
at a phenomenally tiny scale for long periods of time without decay. Plastics must
be blended to withstand massive gravitational forces from the disk’s rotational spin.
Specialized lenses and lasers as well as sensors must be each crafted speciﬁcally for
the use of reading the CD. Software must utilize complex mathematical algorithms
to convert digital information to analog audio. Each of these component technolo-
gies utilized in CDs is in itself more complex than those used in LPs. If we were
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to trace the complexity of each of these component technologies, we could do so at
inﬁnitum. There is something inherently more complex in CDs than LPs, but how
can we measure this?
There is a strategy employed in the innovation economics literature by Jones
(2009). Jones’ work approaches the issue by creating a theoretically derived measure-
ment that proxies for the breadth of knowledge. The logic is as follows. Technological
progress has diﬀering eﬀects on diﬀerent ﬁelds of knowledge particular to an indus-
try. All ﬁelds become more technologically advanced, but not all ﬁelds will become
broader at the same rate that they become deep. While all ﬁelds progress, some have
an intrinsic characteristic that allows them to have a rich broad development. The
breadth necessitates specialization and collaboration. This has important eﬀects for
industry entry and exit costs. Take labor for example, as technologies become more
and more complex, the knowledge required to understand them becomes broader.
The average person must invest more and more time into understanding a narrower
and narrower subset of a much broader technology (Jones 2009). For example, as
political scientists we specialize in a narrow niche of a broader subﬁeld, such as tech-
nology and trade politics under trade politics under international political economy
under political science. But in order to make new meaningful contributions, we can
either learn the wider branches of related knowledge or bring in the knowledge of
colleagues. The same is true for a software programmer. They would specialize
in a particular or subset or programming languages (e.g. Perl, C++, Java) under
a broader programming paradigm (e.g. imperative, declarative, object oriented).
They would additionally take on knowledge and skills required for programming in
a particular industry such as ﬁnance and banking or video game design.
This phenomenon has been used to explain the “death of the Renaissance Man”
by Jones (2009). He expands on Newton’s famous phrase to state that “if one is to
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stand on the shoulders of giants, one must ﬁrst climb up their backs, and the greater
the body of knowledge, the harder this climb becomes.” The argument is that
because the body of knowledge has become so great, no single person can become a
“Renaissance Man.” A commonly used example of a renaissance man or “polymath”
and inventor is Benjamin Franklin who worked in the ﬁelds of politics, demography,
electricity, meteorology, and music among others. While, I do not question Franklin’s
intellectual prowess, the fact is that all these ﬁelds were not as specialized at the
time relative as today. It is much easier to make major contributions in young
underdeveloped ﬁelds. Now, and increasingly so, individuals must either learn more
or specialize in the types of tasks they can undertake. Learning more takes more
time and eﬀort, while specialization decreases the breadth of individual capabilities.
The average individual in technologically complex industries will be highly educated
but also more specialized as some will choose to learn more and others to specialize
(Jones 2009). We should also expect that in technologically complex industries,
individuals are more likely to work in teams given that each individual brings a
narrow contribution.
In the innovation literature, is has been found that the complexity of innovations
varies across industries; this is conceptualized as the average number of individuals
necessary to invent (Jones 2009). To put it another way, the knowledge in some
industries is more complex requiring more contributors on each new innovation. The
evidence that specialization occurs versus more learning is that the average number
of years of education is roughly equal for new innovation. It is the team size and,
therefore, complexity that varies. In other words, individuals choose to spend their
time in education specializing versus spending more time learning everything. In
ﬁelds with deep and broad bodies of knowledge individuals must specialize in a
narrower body of knowledge. Each individual in these industries brings less to the
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innovation table and this ﬁnding is reﬂected in the size of teams required to innovate
(Jones 2009). Another way this can be interpreted is that a bachelor’s degree in
economics and kinesiology both require four years of course work, but one potentially
has a longer, richer, more diverse and complex body of knowledge and skills.
This team size eﬀect has been observed in both innovation and academic work.
Inventions, for example, require diﬀerent types of technical knowledge and therefore,
require the collective work of teams (Jones 2009, Jung and Ejermo 2013). Teams
have been found to become increasingly dominant in academic work as well for
the same reasons. Wuchty et al. (2007) in Science ﬁnd that over the past ﬁve
decades, in twenty million papers, teams have become more frequent compared to
solo publications across all ﬁelds. Additionally they ﬁnd that team papers are cited
more often and this eﬀect has increased over time. Teams of inventors also produce
higher quality work and more contributions than their solo counterparts suggesting
teamwork multiplies the eﬀect of individual characteristics (Jung and Ejermo 2013).
Technological breadth, as measured by patent team size of individual ﬁrm’s patents,
has also been found to be a better predictor of ﬁrm performance than total stock–as
measured by return to invested capital and sales growth (Moorthy and Polley 2010).
Technological innovation makes the climb to the frontier of knowledge harder
because there is a wider body of knowledge and therefore necessitates the need for
specialization. Each industry diﬀers in the types and number of tasks its’ workers and
capital must undertake. Industries with a wide variety of potential tasks will need
more specialized workers and production technologies speciﬁc to that industry. The
ability to perform these tasks will require (re)education of labor and restructuring of
capital. This creates entry and exit costs for new competitors entering an industry.
Some industries have grown more and faster with similar amounts of research and
development (R&D) spending because of greater opportunities for innovation inher-
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ent in their industries which determine the productivity of R&D input (Klevorick et
al. 1995; Nelson and Wolﬀ 1997). Additionally the ability to appropriate technology
for industry use determines the eﬀectiveness of R&D input (Levin et al. 1987). I
argue that technological progress (and opportunities for innovation) further interact
with industry speciﬁc potential for greater complexity creates an uneven distribu-
tion of complexity of tasks between industries. That is the breadth of knowledge and
potential tasks necessary to function within an industry varies between industries.
Industries with greater need for specialization necessitates individuals to invest in
their own human capital to reﬂect industry speciﬁc skills (Jones 2009). Labor and
capital within each industry must invest in unique characteristics that increase their
marginal productivity within a particular industry but has no eﬀect on productiv-
ity in other industries.17 This creates exit costs when labor and capital seeking to
adjust into another industry loses the beneﬁts of their original industry’s speciﬁc
uses. Labor and capital seeking to move into a highly specialized industry will face
signiﬁcant costs to gain industry speciﬁc skills and uses. This echoes research that
utilizes homogenous factor mobility, ﬁnding that technologically advanced economies
have less inter-industry mobility because they rely on more intensive use of speciﬁc
skills and equipment (Hiscox 2002; Hiscox and Rickard 2002).
Following the collaboration, team science and innovation literature (Jones 2009,
Ejermo and Jung 2011), I argue that larger patent team sizes on patents reﬂect the
underlying breadth of knowledge necessary for a particular patent to be invented.
As the larger the breadth of knowledge is, individuals can either spend more time
to learn a broader body of knowledge, or specialize in a narrow ﬁeld. Broadening
one’s ﬁeld tends to be costlier as it takes more time compared to specialization
(Jones 2009). Many will opt to specialize and therefore bring less to the innovation.
17See Becker (2009[1964]) pg. 40 for an example of general versus speciﬁc labor training by ﬁrms.
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Therefore, if a patent has many collaborators I assume that each individual brought
a smaller amount to the table than if the patent had fewer authors. For example,
if we observe that patents ﬁled in an industry exhibit many authors systematically
over many patents within a particular industry we can be conﬁdent that industry is
highly specialized.
In the aggregate the patent data shows that the average team size in the United
States has increased since 1975 from approximately 1.65 team members per patent
to 2.3 team members per patent in 1999. The annual average and maximum team
sizes are shown in Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 respectively. You can see that while the
average may not have increased by a large amount, a minor increase in the average
team size has a large eﬀect theoretically. If a ﬁeld of knowledge moves from primarily
solo inventors or authors to necessitating on average two innovators or coauthorship,
this is a huge structural change. This is what occurs in patent team sizes in 1986.
The median team size increases from one to two in this sample when the average
surpasses two team members per patent. Minimum team size has no variation (every
year has a minimum of one) and therefore I do not plot it. Figure 2.6 shows the time
series of number of patents ﬁled in the United States over the same time period.
Figure 2.5 shows the total stock of patents that exist. If my proposition that team
size reﬂects specialization and specialization reﬂects immobility then it corresponds
to work suggesting that within this time period the average level of inter-industry
mobility declined (Hiscox 2001; Ladewig 2006; others), arguing a heavier reliance on
specialized equipment and knowledge (Hiscox 2002; Hiscox and Rickard 2002).
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Figure 2.3: Annual Average Team Sizes
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Figure 2.5: Total Stock of Patents
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I have used the automobile industry and textiles up until now to motivate my
theoretical examples. But how do the team sizes, or the within industry specializa-
tion, of both industries compare? Automobile manufacturers are a 4-digit SIC code
sub-industry of the 2-digit SIC code corresponding to “Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Industries.” The Textile time-series was created from the 4-digit code for “Textile
Manufacturers,” a sub-industry of “Textile Mill Products” more generally. Figure
2.7 shows the annual team sizes for the automobile (SIC87 3711) and textile manu-
factures (SIC87 2399). As expected from the theory, the team sizes of automobiles
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is higher than that of textiles. While the diﬀerence between the two industries are
seemingly small, they are relatively large. Increasing a an industry’s average patent
team size requirements by one contributor is quite a change. The equivalent in
academia would be the diﬀerence of working in a ﬁeld where one can publish mostly
solo authored papers to a ﬁeld where the average publication requires two coauthors.
I will examine these two industries in more detail in the concluding chapter.
Figure 2.7: Annual Automobile and Textile Manufacturers Team Sizes
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2.5 Within Industry Specialization and Political Mobilization
Lobbying the government directly is one way for actor to inﬂuence trade policy
(Grossman and Helpman 1994). Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) provide an
empirical test of the Grossman-Helpman model of government and industry relations.
They argue that lobbying spending is an important contributing factor to the level
of protection an industry receives.
What can the logic of within industry specialization tell us about the diﬀerent
levels of protection across industries? There is one main implication that ﬂows from
the logic of collective action and inter-industry mobility. If an actor is “stuck” within
an industry, they will be more likely to care about that industry’s overall welfare.
Therefore, if within industry specialization reﬂects an industry’s entry and exit costs,
we would expect industry’s with high specialization to be characterized by higher
eﬀorts by actors within the industry to protect it. The reason why, comes from the
logic of collective action.
Olson (1965) proposed that smaller groups are more able to overcome collective
action problems. The larger the group, the more likely there is free riding and,
therefore, under provisioning of a collective good–in this case, policy. A policy that
beneﬁts a group is essentially a public good for that group in the sense that it is
non-excludable. For a large group, the beneﬁts of lobbying eﬀort will be diﬀuse
among the whole group. The marginal beneﬁt to lobbying eﬀort will be lower given
the incentives for free riding. The outcome for a large group, therefore, is a smaller
beneﬁt to each actor from lobbying so industry speciﬁc lobbying will be low. In fact,
a large group also has problems of monitoring the free riding that non-excludability
encourages. Consider the lobbying eﬀort of actors within industries. If these actors
are less able to switch industries, the eﬀective group size for which cares about a
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speciﬁc policy shrinks. This conjecture about the size of policy beneﬁciaries draws
from the Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner models of trade. If mobility is high,
factor price equalization makes industry membership irrelevant for economic beneﬁts.
Factor of production will matter with high mobility. Therefore, larger coalitions will
be formed than an a coalition of a single industry. This is true, of course, assuming
that the total sum of actors across a factor of production is larger than that across
a whole industry.
On the other hand, there are entry costs associated with within industry spe-
cialization. Entry costs also motivate industry actors to take political action for
their own industry. If entry costs are low, potential competitors can crowd into the
industry and crowd out non-competitive rents. If protecting the industry is futile,
then lobbying for a beneﬁcial policy is unlikely. Consider a ﬁrm that is consider-
ing lobbying for protectionist policy for its industry, such as textiles. As we know
from trade theory, a protectionist policy targeted protecting domestic textile ﬁrms
will increase income for these ﬁrms. While, imports from foreign competitors might
decrease, the higher rates of returns will motivate actors to enter the industry. If
textiles are an industry with low entry costs, that is, there is low technological within
industry specialization, there are little to no barriers preventing competitors from
entering the textile industry and eroding away the higher rates of return. This is
akin to the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model’s expectations of industry speciﬁc trade
protection. Industry speciﬁc returns are eroded away by competitors entering the
industry. e argument of group size and stakes comes directly from Olson (1965) on
collective action and subsequent work by Gilligan (1997) on intra-industry trade.
The larger the group, the more diﬀuse a beneﬁt is to that group. Therefore it is a
balancing act between how large the stakes at hand are, and how large the group
is. In my proposed theory, the stakes are partially determined by the entry/exit
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costs themselves. The greater the entry/exit costs, the greater the stakes because
an actor is stuck in a particular group and dependent on that group’s wellbeing for
their own wellbeing. These same entry/exit costs create the boundaries of a group.
The greater the entry/exit costs of a particular industry, the smaller the “group” is
relative to a bundle of potential industries one might move into or across your entire
factor of production. This is the same dichotomy of group size arguments derived
from Ricardo-Viner and Heckscher-Ohlin models of trade. The industry is always
smaller than an entire factor of production (or a larger aggregation of the deﬁnition
of industry boundaries, i.e. motorcycles and automobiles could be grouped into a
larger industry called transportation equipment).
Figure 2.8: Hypothesized Marginal Eﬀects on Lobbying
If the textile industry had high levels of technological specialization, creating a
“natural” barrier to entry from potential competitors, these gains from trade protec-
tion will not be easily crowded out. The implications are similar to the Ricardo-Viner
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trade model. Industry speciﬁc beneﬁts from protection remain with the industry. In
this case, policy outcomes fall closer to the private good end of the spectrum than
the public good end (Olson 1965). This means that actors within a particular indus-
try derive additional beneﬁts from industry membership. This encourages industry
cohesiveness on a particular policy issue. Actors will seek our a policy that beneﬁts
their in-group. At this stage I only examine the intensity, that is the cohesive demand
of an industry on policy, not yet the preference or direction of lobbying. Therefore,
within industry specialization will determine the ability and intensity of preferences
of actors to act collectively on a political issue. That is, how motivated they are to
contribute to favorable political outcomes. Conditional on the threat to an industry
from foreign competition, within industry specialization will determine the level of
spending on political lobbying. If within industry specialization is high, industries
facing foreign competition will seek to protect their industry (H1). If industry spe-
cialization is low, industries will not act as a cohesive unit. The beneﬁts from being
employed in a particular industry are low as others can crowd into the industry
and current members can cheaply exit. Therefore, in this case I expect increases
in import competition to decrease lobbying eﬀort relative to the high specialization
group (H1). Additionally, for industries with high import penetration, increasing
specialization will increase the motivation of industries to act as a cohesive unit and
increase costs associated to exit. These industries will spend more on lobbying to
protect themselves (H2). Last, those industries with low import penetration, increas-
ing specialization will have a negative eﬀect on political lobbying. These groups face
little challengers from abroad and are also protected by the entry barriers created
from within industry specialization (H2). To summarize, the hypothesis derived are
visualized in Figure 2.8 and written as:
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Hypothesis 1 In industries with high (low) within industry specialization,
increasing import competition has a positive (negative) eﬀect on
political lobbying.
Hypothesis 2 In industries with high (low) import penetration, increasing spe-
cialization has a positive (negative) eﬀect on political lobbying.
2.6 Within Industry Specialization and Trade Policy Outcomes
While my theory has many implications drawn from Ricardo-Viner versus Heckscher-
Ohlin framework, it is actually a synthesis of intra-industry trade theory. In my
theory, ﬁxed costs associated with economies of scale create theoretical conclusions
that mimic those of the Ricardo-Viner model. The higher the costs to entry into
an industry, the more the speciﬁc industry behaves as if it were in a Ricardo-Viner
– that is, zero or low factor mobility – type of economy. This is slightly diﬀerent
from the traditional Ricardo-Viner/Heckscher-Ohlin approach where all industries
in an economy are treated as having a single level of factor mobility. Unpacking the
blackbox of “factor mobility” into industry speciﬁc “mobilities” is a natural exten-
sion into intra-industry trade models based on economies of scale and ﬁxed costs.
Existing work has posited that increasing returns to scale drive a country’s politics
towards regional economic integration (Milner 1997). While my theory does not di-
rectly address regional integration, it does illuminate some additional insight to the
idiosyncracies addressed by Milner (1997). For example, she concludes that ﬁrms
with economies of scale may beneﬁt more from regional integration than global inte-
gration. Similarly, as within industry specialization behaves similarly, probably as a
compliment to standard ﬁxed costs, those ﬁrms in industries with high within indus-
try specialization may be pushing for reduced barriers through regional integration.
Currently, I examine only overall lobbying and tariﬀ levels and do not distinguish
between those speciﬁc to regional agreements.
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To determine whether industries receive the trade policy they prefer, we need
to ﬁrst derive their preference for either protection or free trade. First, using the
Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner framework we can determine whether trade pol-
icy will be along industry lines or not. If an industry is characterized by high within
industry specialization, we eﬀectively have a Ricardo-Viner derived preference. In-
dustry actors stuck in their industry will want to protect it. If an industry has low
within industry specialization, we have Heckscher-Ohlin type preferences. Actors
will not care about their industry of employment because they can either cheaply
move to another industry or they do not really derive any industry speciﬁc rents
because of competitors entering the industry.
Figure 2.9: Hypothesized Marginal Eﬀects on Trade Barriers
I derive four conditional hypotheses for the interaction of within industry spe-
cialization and import competition. These conditional hypotheses are summarized
in Figure 2.9, where the left diagram gives the hypothesized eﬀects of import com-
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petition given levels of specialization. The dark lines represent the hypothesized
marginal eﬀects of specialization and import penetration respectively. If the line is
above the zero (no eﬀect) cutoﬀ, I expect that variable to have a positive eﬀect on
trade barriers. If it is below, then I expect the variable to have a negative eﬀect.
There are four possible combinations of the specialization and import penetration
interaction with ﬁve theoretical implications. It is important to emphasize that both
protection (at least as a tariﬀ) has declined over time and technology has become
more complex over time. What I am really talking about when I say an industry
will increase its level of lobbying or have higher tariﬀ rates is that the relative rate
of change between industries will be diﬀerent. The theory and empirical models
approaches this from a long run equilibrium framework, that at any given time the
levels will be higher/lower for a speciﬁc industry. But again, in reality it is that over
time certain industries had slower reduction in protection.
First, as specialization increases to a level high enough to create suﬃciently high
entry/exit costs as to motivate actors to overcome collective action problems, the
expected eﬀect of increasing import competition to be positive (H3). Second, low
specialization industries are unable to overcome collective action problems, face po-
tential entrants due to crowding, and face little costs to exit. These are the indus-
tries that have their preferences washed out at the negotiation table. There are two
alternative hypotheses for the low within industry specialization case. Either indus-
tries will be completely unable to receive protection because they do not lobby hard
enough (H3), or they will be “thrown under the bus” as concessions for reciprocal
trade policy negotiations (H3).
Third, when import competition is high then increasing specialization would in-
crease what is at stake for your particular industry. These actors are stuck in their
industry and face foreign competitors. Not only do actors face high costs from foreign
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competition but also from exiting the industry (H4). Fourth, if import competition
is low, I expect to observe that increasing specialization will decrease barriers (H4).
These industries do not need or seek protection. Increasing specialization would
have the eﬀect of allowing them to overcome collective action problems and lobby
for reciprocal reductions abroad. Or alternatively, it is possible that at low levels of
import competition, specialization actually has a moderate protection eﬀect where
the need for trade barriers are oﬀset by entry costs into the particular industry. These
would eﬀectively be protecting industries from potential competitors crowding into
the industry. Again, negating the preference for high trade barriers. The hypotheses
are summarized as:
Hypothesis 3 In industries with high (low) within industry specialization,
increasing import competition has a positive (no / negative)
eﬀect on trade barriers.
Hypothesis 4 In industries with high (low) import penetration, increasing
specialization has a positive (negative) eﬀect on trade barriers.
As a preliminary look into the hypotheses I examine the population of industries
within a two-by-two table. Table 2.1 is a crosstabulation with high and low import
penetration on the horizontal axis and within industry specialization on the vertical
axis. High and low were determined by examining the distribution of the two vari-
ables. This scatterplot is the basis for an empirical robustness test based on the idea
that the theory should most strongly predict the extremes at the very least. This
ﬁgure is 4.15 in Chapter 4. The high and low cutoﬀ point for import penetration
is at the 90th percentile where the top ten percent of industries with highest rates
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of import penetration are labeled as high. The cutoﬀ point for within industry spe-
cialization was similarly chosen as one and a half team members. Industries with
greater than one and a half patent team members on average were coded as high.
Examining the table illuminates a number of initial patterns that support my
arguments. First, I included the average tariﬀ rate for each quadrant. Given the
theory, I would expect those with high import penetration and high within industry
specialization to have the highest tariﬀ rates. While, low/high and high/low are
close in tariﬀ magnitude the high/high quadrant is indeed higher. This ﬁnding is
merely preliminary and will be examined with greater empirical rigor in Chapter
4. The last thing of note in this table is the list of example industries in each
quadrant. I selected the industries by ranking them by how often they came up
in each category. These then were added in alphabetically, in no particular order
on additional variables other than their frequency in each category. On face value,
each group seems to ﬁt in each category based on my theory. For example, the low
within industry specialization industries are less technologically complex industries
such as broadwoven fabric mills and pottery products. Also, those industries with
low or high import penetration correspond to those one might think are heavily
imported or not. For example, high import penetration includes toys, clothing, and
computer equipment. While low import penetration includes those that make more
sense to be produced domestically such as sheet metal work (not sheet metal itself),
dental supplies, and small arms/munitions. In the next chapter I examine lobbying
expenditure based on these categorizations in a fully interactive model and follow up
with a chapter on tariﬀ rates themselves.
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3. HETEROGENOUS WITHIN-INDUSTRY SPECIALIZATION, COLLECTIVE
ACTION, AND INDUSTRY LEVEL LOBBYING
In this chapter, I present the ﬁrst empirical test of the theoretical implications of
within industry specialization. Before looking at actual policy outcomes, I examine
the intensity of industry lobbing. Diﬀering lobbying levels are an antecedent observ-
able implication of the theory proposed in the previous chapter. I would like to see
whether or not actors care more about industry membership when specialization is
high. I argue that the results here show that this is indeed the case. Controlling for
a variety of factors that could contribute to lobbying expenditures, industries with
higher levels of within industry specialization on average spend more on lobbying.
To summarize; I assume actors within an industry are rational and care about
increasing (or maintaining) their own economic well-being. The theoretical unit of
analysis, the actor, is simply a single owner of a factor of production such as land,
labor, or capital. I focus primarily on labor, and to an extent capital, as examples of
specialized uses and tasks are easier to examine. I also derive these actor’s preferences
from the two classical trade models, Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner. That is, do
factor owners care about which of the three factors they own (HO) or do they care
about which industry they employ the factor (RV)? This is going to be determined
by how costly it is to move from one industry to another. To put this very simply:
(1) If you can’t leave your industry, you will care about the industry’s health. (2) If
your factor is making you extra money just because it’s in your industry, you will care
about the industry’s health. Next, the level you care about industry membership
or factor ownership is going to interact with how much foreign competition you face
to determine your intensity of lobbying. This is what I empirically examine in this
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chapter. If actors stuck within industries tend to lobby more intensively, we should
also expect them to be more likely to actually receive the policy outcome they prefer.
In Chapter 4, I examine the actual policy outcomes using this exact same logic.
3.1 Research Design
The variables used in this dissertation span overs 385 U.S. industries at the 4-
digit SIC87 level spanning from 1976 to 2013.1 In this chapter, I examine the level of
industry eﬀort towards changing policy. A number of factors reduce the number of
usable observations in this chapter. Data limitations are discussed in the discussion
below. The dependent variable, industry-year average spending on political contribu-
tions, varies across industries and time as a response to many heterogenous industry
and temporal characteristics. Table 3.1 contains the full summary statistics of the
raw, full sample data for all the variables used to compile the data in this analysis.
This data is used for both the analysis in this chapter and Chapter 5. Table 3.2
summarizes the cross-correlations of the same raw variables.
1This corresponds to 20 industries at the 2-digit SIC87 level. Summarized in Appendix A.
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3.2 Dependent and Independent Variables
3.2.1 Industry Lobbying Expenditures
The dependent variable of interest here is collective action eﬀorts, i.e., the total
eﬀort an industry expends on inﬂuencing politics. Prior work has utilized lobbying
expenditures and political involvement of employees to operationalize collective ac-
tion (Busch and Reinhardt 2000). I take a similar approach by utilizing data from the
Center for Responsive Politics.2 Other studies have utilized complaints logged with
the International Trade Commission (Gilligan 1997) and debates in the U.S congress
(Hiscox 2001). For the analysis in this dissertation I focus on lobbying expenditures.
The raw lobbying data has its own industry coding scheme, this was matched with
SIC-87 4-digit codes to merge with the patent, trade, and industry data.
The distribution of spending is concentrated near 0 with 214 industry-years with
zero spending. Figure 3.1 summarizes the frequency distribution of the whole vari-
able.3 Ten percent of industry-years have spending less than $50,000. Half of the
industry-years have spending of more than $1.3 million and a whole quarter have
spending over $5 million. The largest spenders are spending over $100 million a
year! For example the top 5 industries in 2011 spent $241 million (pharmaceuticals),
$158 million (insurance), $150 million (oil and gas), $145 million (electric utilities,
non-tradable), and $126 million (computers). Spending is of course sensitive to the
economic climate. For example, the number of lobbyists and total spending of the
automobile industry drastically increased around the 2008 crisis and fell shortly af-
ter. This type of behavior is exactly what I am trying to explain in this chapter.
Figure 3.2 displays the annual box plots for lobbying expenditures for the whole time
2The data set was downloaded from http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/. A bulk data set
download is available by creating a free account with the Center.
3Taking the log of lobbying to control for industry size did not drastically change the results. I
additionally rely on other control variables to take account of industry size.
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period available.
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Lobbying Ex-
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Figure 3.2: Box Plots of Lobbying Expen-
ditures over Time
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The variable itself, Lit, was constructed for each industry-year by summing ﬁrm
level lobbying to create industry totals with exactly 4600 potentially usable observa-
tions spanning 223 industries from 1998 to 2013. Given the scaling of the variable, I
take the natural log of the lobbying expenditures to normalize the data and adjust
for industry scale issues.4 However, because the rest of the data spans from 1975 to
1999, the analysis in this chapter is limited to two years. This, combined with list-
wise deletion ultimately reduces the usable observations to about 332 industry-years.
The shape of the distribution and summary statistics changed very little when losing
these observations.5
4Industries with conﬁrmed zero spending on lobbying are treated as 0.0001 and then logged.
Otherwise they would drop out as you cannot take the natural log of zero.
5I assume that the observations lost due to merging are missing at random. There is no reason
to believe there is a relationship (selection bias) between why they are missing and any of my
variables.
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3.2.2 Within Industry Specialization
Industry speciﬁc within industry specialization is measured as an industry’s av-
erage patent inventor team size per year. The data come from the US Patent Oﬃce
and were compiled by Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2001).6 The updated version of
the dataset contains information on over 3 million patents from 1963 to 2006. Ulti-
mately, this data is limited to just under 3 million patents from 1975-1999 due to lack
of available information on counts of patent team members. The data on individ-
ual team members were collapsed on the patents they are cited on to create counts
of the number of inventor, countp, per patent, p. Additionally, a count of patents
per industry, i and year, t, was created to compute the averages and is denoted as
nit. These were matched using updated patent data that contained patent to 4-digit
SIC concordances to create team size averages, Sit per 4-digit SIC87 industry year.
7
These were calculated as Sit =
∑n
i=1
countpit
nit
. For comparison, the national economy-
wide average was also computed for the economy as a whole as at =
∑n
i=1
countpt
nt
. To
ensure that the measurements capture as much information as possible all averages
were compiled from the original whole patent dataset and not a trimmed version lim-
ited by availability of other variables. This was then aggregated to create a 10-year
running average.
Patent data does have its limitations. Patents by nature are a voluntary disclosure
of information in return for temporary legal rights to their use guaranteed by the
government. Not all inventors, individuals or ﬁrms, want to disclose the information
given alternatives such as secrecy. Additionally, not all patents meet the criteria set
by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce as novel, non-trial, and having a commercial
6The data is available on the NBER website at http://www.nber.org/patents/.
7The updated data is available either by linking from the aforementioned NBER website or
directly at https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home.
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application (Hall et al. 2001, pg 4). However, unless the will or need to disclose
information through patents is correlated with the complexity of the patent (i.e.
team size), these limitations should not be a problem in this analysis.
3.2.3 Industry Import Competition
Import competition is a key determinant of the political preferences of industries
over trade policy. Where the level of Intra-Industry trade (Gilligan 1997), electoral
institutions (Kono 2009) and within industry specialization (argued here) determine
the ability for economic interests to lobby and gain protection, import competition
determines the nature of economic preferences. But, for the purposes of the anal-
ysis in this chapter, import competition is utilized to proxy for intensity of harm
actors within an industry face not the direction of preference for or against protec-
tion. Industries facing import competition that lose income due to cheaper foreign
imports will lobby more intensely. Industries facing little competition are conversely,
less likely to lobby as intensely. Whether or not these industries lobby will be con-
ditional on overcoming collective action problems (Gilligan 1997). The ability to
overcome collective action problems being determined by the level of industry spe-
ciﬁc entry/exit costs as measured by within industry specialization. The level of
import competition is operationalized as the total value of importsit for each indus-
try i at year t. The data for this variable is taken from Bernard, Jensen, and Schott
(2006).
3.2.4 Controls
Intra-Industry Trade Some work has examined the eﬀects of intra-industry trade on
collective action and trade barriers. Gilligan (1997) for example argues that ﬁrms
involved in intra-industry trade are eﬀectively monopolists in the good they produce,
thus lobbying for policy is a private good and collective action problems disappear
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(pg 464) and industries will lobby for protection.8 To account for potential eﬀects of
intra-industry trade, I control for it utilizing a commonly employed measure of Intra-
Industry trade, the Grubel-Lloyed index (Grubel and Lloyed 1975). It is calculated
as IITit = 1 − |Exportsit−Importsit|Exportsit+Importsit and ranges from 0 (no intra-industry trade) to
1 (all trade is intra-industry). A modiﬁed version of this was also calculated as
IITmit =
Exportsit−Importsit
Exportsit+Importsit
which “unwraps” the standard Grubel-Lloyed index so
that a value of -1 denotes only exports, 0 is only intra-industry trade, and 1 is only
imports. This version is used in the robustness checks in Chapter 4.
Trade Costs A measure of trade costs from Schott (2008) is included as a control for
each industry year and denoted as Costsit. These are calculated as transportation
costs plus the cost of insuring shipments. Trade costs are an important factor in in-
ternational trade. For example, in gravity models, distance between two economies
proxies for transportation costs. Trade costs play an important role in determining
which goods get exported/imported through their eﬀect on local comparative advan-
tage. While a country may be comparatively advantaged in producing a particular
good, high transportation costs may make it too expensive to export. The logic is
that it may be cheaper to produce in the comparatively advantaged country, but the
production cost plus transportation costs exceeds the price at which the good could
be sold in the foreign market and therefore, will not be exported/imported (Schott
2008).
Total Factor Productivity To control for the productivity of an industry a measure
of total factor productivity is included and denoted as TFP5it. Productivity is an
important determinant of which ﬁrms will export when exposed to international mar-
kets, which will produce only for domestic markets, and which will exit or die out
8See also Kono (2006) for an extension with electoral institutions coming into play. He argues
that intra-industry trade leads to protection only when electoral institutions favor narrow interests.
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(Melitz 2003). While the data examined here are not at the ﬁrm level, at the indus-
try level we would expect higher productivity to be correlated with the existence of
a larger number of productive ﬁrms. This measure is based on ﬁve factors of pro-
duction: non-production workers (number of), production workers (worker hours),
energy (real expenditures), materials (real non-energy expenditures), and capital
(real value total stock). The annual change in total factor productivity is also in-
cluded. The data is from the Becker et al.’s (2013[1996]) NBER-CES Manufacturing
Industry Database9
Industry Size To control for industry size and importance in both the economy and in
politics, three variables are included. The ﬁrst are total employment in thousands of
workers, Empit, and total payroll paid to these workers in millions, Payit. The third
is investment, or capital expenditures, in millions of dollars and denoted as Capit.
This data is also from the Becker et al.’s (2013[1996]) NBER-CES Manufacturing
Industry Database. Industry size, particularly the size of employment, may be a
good way to measure potential for collective action. The logic being that smaller
groups are more likely to overcome collective action problems given that any beneﬁts
from trade policy will be more concentrated and a higher potential for excludability
(Alt and Gilligan 1994).
3.3 Methodology and Results
The dependent variable for all models is the total industry spending on political
contributions, Lit. The are two primary independent variables of interest included in
all models. The ﬁrst is specialization, Sit, as measured by the 4-digit SIC industry
average patent team size. The second variable is represents import competition,
importsit, and is measured as total value of imports. A number of controls discussed
9The data covers 459 4-digit SIC87 industries over 52 years. This data is available at http:
//www.nber.org/data/nberces5809.html.
55
above are included.
3.3.1 Diagnostics
Clustered standard errors were used for each industry. Residuals plotted against
ﬁtted values from Model 1 and 2 without ﬁxed eﬀects displayed minor levels of het-
eroscedasticity. A likelihood ratio test was conducted to test for panel heteroscedas-
ticity by estimating the model using an iterated generalized least square estimator
taking into account panel heteroscedasticity and one that did not.10 The results of
the likelihood ratio test favor taking into account panel heteroscedasticity. Haus-
man tests for ﬁxed eﬀects versus random eﬀects reject the null hypothesis that the
models yield comparable coeﬃcient estimates. Therefore, the random eﬀects model
is rejected over the ﬁxed eﬀects model. However, due to data limitations caused by
listwise deletion in Model 3, all ﬁnal models were estimated without ﬁxed eﬀects.
There are more industries at the 4-digit SIC87 level than observations because of
limited overlap between the lobbying and industry data sets. Fixed eﬀects at the
2-digit SIC87 level did not change the results much either, but did marginally reduce
signiﬁcance of the IVs. Additionally, because of the limited number of years, just
two, I also controlled for year ﬁxed eﬀects. The year ﬁxed eﬀect was not signiﬁcant,
nor had any eﬀect on the results in any of the models and is therefore left out. The
results from the models without ﬁxed eﬀects are shown below.
Because of the time series concerns inherent in the structure of the data, panel
data unit root and autocorrelation were conducted. The panels were fairly unbal-
anced, therefore, Fisher-type (Choi 2001) tests were conducted which allow for un-
10I assume that panels are not correlated with each other. There is no reason to believe they
should be so from the theory. The level of within industry specialization in one industry should
have no eﬀect on another. Unless, somehow, industries compete with each other on innovation
complexity. It is more plausible that if there is competition, it is among ﬁrms within the same
industry (either domestically or with foreign competitors).
56
balanced panels. Both both Augmented-Dicky-Fuller and Phillips-Perron versions
of the test were conducted on the primary dependent (lobbying expenditure) and
independent variables (specialization and import competition). The Fisher-type test
performs a unit-root test on each panel separately and then combines the p-values
to create an overall test statistic for whether or not the panel data contains a unit
root. These tests rejected the null hypothesis that all panels contained a unit root
for all three variables. Additionally, an appropriate test for panel data serial auto-
correlation was conducted on the same three variables and failed to reject the null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation (Wooldridge 2002; Drukker 2003). Again, the ﬁnal
models only span two years. Using a year dummy had no eﬀect on results.
The distribution of the patent team size variable shows a decline in density to-
wards values above three team members per patent. This raises the concern that
these higher values might be outliers. Additionally, there might be other outlying
cases not immediately obvious, therefore I test for multivariate outliers that may be
potentially driving my results. To test for multivariate outliers I calculated Cook’s
distances from the full model. Two observations have Cook’s distances near, but still
under, a value of one–the standard cut oﬀ value for a multivariate outlier with high
inﬂuence (Cook 1977; Cook 1979; Cook and Weisberg 1982). The two observations
were Malt Beverages in 1999 (SIC87 - 2082), Candy and other Confectionary Prod-
ucts in 1999 (SIC87 - 2064). Both of these have relatively large levels of spending
on lobbying (> $1mil), above average patent team sizes (> 2), relatively low import
penetration (< 0.1) and moderate levels of intra-industry trade (∼ 0.5). Removing
these had very marginal changes to the estimated coeﬃcients and standard errors.
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3.3.2 Results
Table 4.1 summarizes the regression results for the three models. The ﬁrst model
contains only the main eﬀects specialization and import competition, both of which
are positive as I would expect but they are not statistically signiﬁcant. This is not
too much a concern as the theory predicted is conditional on the interaction between
specialization and import competition. The second model contains the main eﬀects,
plus the interaction term between them. Here we see that the main eﬀect for import
penetration and the interaction are signiﬁcant. And the ﬁnal model adds the series of
controls mentioned above. As the marginal eﬀects of the main eﬀects and interaction
term depend on the variances and covariances of each other, the coeﬃcients for
these terms are not directly interpretable (Brambor et al. 2006; Berry et al. 2012;
Aiken and West 1991). Therefore, marginal eﬀects were calculated for specialization
and import competition based on the values of the other. The marginal eﬀect of
specialization across values of import penetration are displayed in Figure 3.3. While
the marginal eﬀects of import penetration across values of specialization are displayed
in Figure 3.4. In both ﬁgures, the thick lines represent the marginal eﬀects, the thick
and thin dashed lines represent 90 and 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
The ﬁrst model, which contains only the constituent terms of the variables of
interest, shows that when holding import penetration constant, increasing special-
ization decreases spending on lobbying. The real eﬀect of import penetration is
expected to be conditional on specialization (and vice versa). Therefore, interpret-
ing the marginal eﬀects of specialization and import penetration is necessary to test
the conditional hypotheses outlined earlier. These are calculated and summarized
in Figure 3.3 which corresponds to Hypotheses 1, and Figure 3.4 which corresponds
to Hypothesis 2. Both marginal eﬀects plots look like those predicted by the the-
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ory in Chapter 2. The marginal eﬀect of imports is negative when specialization
is low. Suggesting lack of industry cohesiveness and importance for the constituent
actors. While specialization is high, increasing imports has a positive eﬀect on lobby-
ing. Again, supporting the idea that when actors are stuck in an industry, industry
speciﬁc rents and membership matters. For the other side of the interaction, the
marginal eﬀect of specialization when import competition is low is negative. Sug-
gesting that increasing specialization when import competition is low to begin with,
just decreases the need for lobbying. Lastly, the marginal eﬀect of specialization
is positive as expected when import competition is high. This essentially shows
how much actors within an industry care about their industry membership when
facing foreign competition. When facing foreign competition, decreasing special-
ization reduces the importance of industry membership (and presumably increases
the importance of factor ownership). While increasing specialization under foreign
competition increases how stuck actors are within the industry, and increases their
preference for lobbying.
Figure 3.3: Marginal Eﬀect of Specializa-
tion on Lobbying
0
100
200
300
400
0 1000 2000
Imports
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ffe
ct
 o
f S
pe
ci
al
iz
at
io
n
Figure 3.4: Marginal Eﬀect of Import
Penetration on Lobbying
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Table 3.3: Results
Dependent variable:
ln(Lobbying)
(1) (2) (3)
Specialization Sit −0.388 1.216 −0.950
(0.348) (0.782) (0.855)
Imports Pit 0.024
∗∗ −0.086∗∗ −0.101∗∗
(0.011) (0.038) (0.050)
Sit ∗ Pit 0.023∗ 0.031∗∗
(0.014) (0.019)
Controls:
Trade Costs −18.859
(18.638)
Intra-Industry Trade 0.900
(2.722)
Total Factor Productivity 2.090
(3.648)
ΔTFP 10.525
(9.639)
Employment −0.068
(0.0613)
Pay Roll 0.001
(0.001)
Investment 0.001
(0.002)
Constant 9.804∗∗∗ 7.944∗∗∗ 7.182
(1.542) (1.8732) (4.505)
Observations 129 129 117
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.067 0.095
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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3.4 Concluding Remarks
In this dissertation, I build support for my proposed theory in two stages. This
chapter is tackles the ﬁrst stage, whether or not within industry specialization in-
ﬂuences collective action (lobbying) behavior in general. When facing some threat
(foreign competition) actors will react collectively (lobbying) to protect themselves
(tariﬀ). The cohesiveness and intensity of actors acting as an “industry” will depend
on the industry’s entry/exit costs. If an actor is “stuck” within an industry, they
will be more likely to care about that industry’s overall welfare.
The next chapter examines the second stage–whether or not industries get the
protection (tariﬀ) they prefer as predicted by classical trade models.
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4. HETEROGENOUS WITHIN-INDUSTRY SPECIALIZATION, COLLECTIVE
ACTION, AND TRADE POLICY
This chapter presents the second empirical test of within industry specialization.
I examine the actual political outcomes due to diﬀering levels of within industry
specialization. In the last chapter, I provided evidence for higher levels of lobbying
spending by high WIS industries. I argued that this is support for my intuition that
industry technological complexity creates entry/exit barriers. This makes industry
membership a motivating issue for policy preferences. Caring about an industry
also helps actors within an industry to overcome collective action problems and
lobby more intensely as a single voice. This chapter examines the next theoretical
stage after lobbying, the actual trade policy outcomes for an industry. Utilizing
import/export data, I am able to test whether or not an industry receives its preferred
policy outcome as predicted by well-established trade theories.
4.1 Research Design
The data in this chapter covers a larger scope than the previous chapter which
was limited by lobbying data. The empirical analysis in this chapter covers 385 U.S.
industries at the 4-digit SIC87 level over 24 years from 1976 to 1999.1 The data is
therefore structured as pooled cross-sectional time series. The dependent variable,
tariﬀ rates, varies across industries and time as a response to many heterogenous
industry and temporal characteristics. One of these characteristics that is of spe-
ciﬁc interest in this analysis is industry level relative specialization as a proxy for
industry entry and exit costs. To model and control for these time and panel speciﬁc
variations, multilevel least squares estimators are used. Table 3.1 contains the full
1This corresponds to 20 industries at the 2-digit SIC87 level. Summarized in Appendix A.
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summary statistics for all the variables used to compile the data in this analysis.
4.2 Dependent and Independent Variables
4.2.1 Trade Protection
The dependent variable used in the analysis is simply the industry tariﬀ rate. One
foreseeable limitation of using the tariﬀ rate is that trade protection is potentially
obfuscated with non-tariﬀ barriers (Kono 2006). For now however, in this analysis I
stick with simple tariﬀ rates. Trade protection is operationalized as the ad valorem
tariﬀ rate for each year at the 4-digit SIC87 industry level. This variable is computed
as duties collected, dutiesit, weighted by the free-on-board customs value of imports,
importsit, for the respective industry for each industry year and ranges from zero to
one. Calculated as Dit =
dutiesit
dutiesit+importsit
.2 Available data covers 459 industries over
25 years from 1974 to 1999. Figure 4.1 displays the frequency distribution of the
tariﬀ rate. The ﬁrst, and tallest, bar is when the tariﬀ rate is zero. Figure 4.2 shows
the tariﬀ rate as box plots over time. The data comes from the US Customs service
and was originally compiled by Feenstra, Romalis and Schott (2002). The particular
version used in this prospectus is from Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006).3
2An alternative version of this data can also be created from Schott (2008). The dutiesit
reported in the summary statistics is from Schott (2008), hence the discrepancy in the number of
observations. This version is used in calculating the alternate dependent variable. The dependent
variable used in this chapter was precalculated by Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) and spans
more observations than Schott (2008).
3The data is available on Peter Schott’s personal website at http://faculty.som.yale.edu/
peterschott/sub_international.htm.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of Tariﬀ Rate
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Figure 4.2: Box Plots of Tariﬀ Rate over
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4.2.2 Within Industry Specialization
This chapter uses the same independent variable as the prior chapter, within
industry specialization, as a proxy for industry speciﬁc entry and exit costs.
4.2.3 Industry Import Competition
Import competition is a key determinant of the political preferences of industries
over trade policy. Where the level of Intra-Industry trade (Gilligan 1997), electoral
institutions (Kono 2009) and within industry specialization (argued here) determine
the ability for economic interests to lobby and gain protection, import competition
determines the nature of economic preferences. That is, what economic actors want
from their governments. Industries facing import competition that lose income due
to cheaper foreign imports are more likely to prefer and lobby for trade protection.
Industries facing little competition are conversely, less likely to lobby for trade pro-
tection and will have lower trade barriers. Additionally, low import competition
industries that are eﬃcient enough to export may in fact lobby for trade liberaliza-
tion if it is reciprocal, increasing their market exposure abroad (Gilligan 1997). For
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now, the data used in this prospectus cannot distinguish reciprocity in trade barrier
declines. However, this should not be a problem as theoretically we would expect
exporters to either not care about decreasing trade barriers in their industry and
therefore, not lobby or they would be ok with reductions because they are competi-
tive enough to compete and lobby for reciprocal reductions in barriers. In either case,
we would observe low import penetration (potentially exporting) industries having
lower trade barriers.
For the purposes of the analysis in this prospectus, import competition is uti-
lized as a proxy for the direction of trade preferences. Simply put, industries
facing import competition want protection, and those facing little to no competi-
tion do not. Whether or not these industries lobby and/or receive their preferred
policy outcome will be conditional on overcoming collective action problems (Gilli-
gan 1997). The ability to overcome collective action problems being determined
by the level of industry speciﬁc entry/exit costs as measured by within industry
specialization. The level of import competition is operationalized as import pene-
tration as commonly measured in the literature. Import penetration is calculated
as Pit =
importsit
productionit−exportsit+importsit where importsit and exportsit are imports and
exports of each 4-digit SIC87 industry per year and productionit is the total domes-
tic production in that industry-year. The interpretation of import penetration is
the share of imports as a matter of total domestic consumption. Where domestic
consumption is the total level of production of a particular good less exports sent
away to be consumed in other countries, plus imports from foreign countries to be
consumed domestically. Those with an import penetration equal to one are removed
from the sample as these are industries with no consumption of domestically pro-
duced goods. They either export everything they produce, or do not produce what
so ever (i.e. this industry does not exist in the United States). The data for this
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variable is taken from Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006).
4.2.4 Controls
This chapter uses the same control variables as the prior chapter. These include
the Grubel-Lloyed index of “trade overlap” or intra-industry trade, trade costs, total
factor productivity, and a number of variables to control for industry size.
4.3 Methodology and Results
The dependent variable for all models is the ad valorem tariﬀ rate, Dit. The
the primary independent variable of interest included in all models is specialization,
Sit, as measured by the 4-digit SIC industry average patent team size. The second
variable of interest represents import competition, Pit, and is measured as import
penetration. A number of controls discussed above are included. Models were es-
timated using least squares with industry ﬁxed eﬀects and cluster robust standard
errors at the 4-digit industry level. Models were additionally run with year ﬁxed
eﬀects which did not aﬀect the results. The next section reports diagnostics to the
eﬀect of potential time series issues and the empirical results are followed by a section
tests for potential endogeneity.4
4.3.1 Diagnostics
The data used in this chapter in its raw form is the same as the previous chapter.
The main diﬀerence is that in this chapter I do not create 10-year aggregates of the
observations. The same diagnostics were conducted as the previous chapters and the
4Earlier model speciﬁcations (for the tariﬀ chapter, the lobbying chapters lack of data did not
allow for much experimenting with model choice) that were omitted did include year ﬁxed eﬀects.
This did not change the results in most cases (except the patent stock variable). It did introduce
peculiar time structures into the model residuals of all models that did not exist without them.
Additional models attempted included a lagged dependent variable (without ﬁxed eﬀects) with
calculated instantaneous impacts and long term eﬀects. These models also did not have drastically
diﬀerent results. These models were removed in much earlier drafts of the dissertation in favor of
parsimony in the results section. There are already many models reported as it is.
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results from these diagnostics are very similar. Fixed eﬀects with clustered robust
standard errors were used for each industry. Residuals plotted against ﬁtted values
from the full model without ﬁxed eﬀects displayed minor levels of heteroscedasticity.
A likelihood ratio test was conducted to test for panel heteroscedasticity by estimat-
ing the full model using an iterated generalized least square estimator taking into
account panel heteroscedasticity and one that did not.5 The results of the likelihood
ratio test favor taking into account panel heteroscedasticity. Hausman tests for ﬁxed
eﬀects versus random eﬀects reject the null hypothesis that the models yield compa-
rable coeﬃcient estimates. Therefore, the random eﬀects model is rejected over the
ﬁxed eﬀects model.
Because of the time series concerns inherent in the structure of the data, panel
data unit root and autocorrelation were conducted. The panels were fairly unbal-
anced, therefore, Fisher-type (Choi 2001) tests were conducted which allow for un-
balanced panels. Both both Augmented-Dicky-Fuller and Phillips-Perron versions
of the test were conducted on the primary dependent (tariﬀ rate) and independent
variables (specialization and import competition). The Fisher-type test performs a
unit-root test on each panel separately and then combines the p-values to create an
overall test statistic for whether or not the panel data contains a unit root. These
tests rejected the null hypothesis that all panels contained a unit root for all three
variables. Additionally, an appropriate test for panel data serial autocorrelation was
conducted on the same three variables and failed to reject the null hypothesis of no
autocorrelation (Wooldridge 2002; Drukker 2003).
The distribution of the patent team size variable shows a decline in density to-
5I assume that panels are not correlated with each other. There is no reason to believe they
should be so from the theory. The level of within industry specialization in one industry should
have no eﬀect on another. Unless, somehow, industries compete with each other on innovation
complexity. It is more plausible that if there is competition, it is among ﬁrms within the same
industry (either domestically or with foreign competitors).
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wards values above three team members per patent. This raises the concern that
these higher values might be outliers. Additionally, there might be other outlying
cases not immediately obvious, therefore I test for multivariate outliers that may be
potentially driving my results. To test for multivariate outliers I calculated Cook’s
distances from the full model. None of the observations have Cook’s distances near,
but still under, a value of one–the standard cut oﬀ value for a multivariate outlier
with high inﬂuence (Cook 1977; Cook 1979; Cook and Weisberg 1982).6
4.3.2 Primary Model Results
Table 4.1 summarizes the regression results for the three models. The ﬁrst model
contains only the main eﬀects specialization and import competition, both of which
are negative and statistically signiﬁcant. And the ﬁnal model adds a series of controls
outlined above. As the marginal eﬀects of the main eﬀects and interaction term
depend on the variances and covariances of each other, the coeﬃcients for these terms
are not directly interpretable (Brambor et al. 2006; Berry et al. 2012; Aiken and
West 1991). Therefore, marginal eﬀects were calculated for specialization and import
competition based on the values of the other. The marginal eﬀect of specialization
across values of import penetration are displayed in Figure 4.3. While the marginal
eﬀects of import penetration across values of specialization are displayed in Figure
4.4. In both ﬁgures, the thick lines represent the marginal eﬀects, the thick and thin
dashed lines represent 90 and 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
The ﬁrst model, which contains only the constituent terms of the variables of
interest, shows that when holding import penetration constant, increasing specializa-
tion decreases tariﬀ rates. Additionally, the ﬁrst model shows that increasing import
penetration decreases tariﬀs contrary to conventional theoretical expectations that
6There were some multivariate outliers in the simpler models without controls.
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increasing import competition increases demand for trade protection. This pattern
holds for the next two models. Theoretically the main eﬀect of import penetration
should be positive. However, many factors go into determining tariﬀ rates. Omitted
variable bias such as the lack of the predicted interaction term and controls might
be at play here. In fact once both the interaction and controls are included, the
marginal eﬀects plots look like those hypothesized in Chapter 2. The second model
contains the two main eﬀects, plus the interaction term between them. Therefore,
interpreting the marginal eﬀects of specialization and import penetration is neces-
sary to test the conditional hypotheses outlined earlier. These are calculated and
summarized in Figure 4.3 which corresponds to Hypotheses 3, and Figure 4.4 which
corresponds to Hypothesis 4. Though the slopes of the marginal eﬀects are not as
steep as they would be ideally, both slopes are positive and signiﬁcant where pre-
dicted. Given this I am able to conﬁdently but with some caveats reject that there
is no eﬀect of specialization conditional on import penetration (and vice versa). The
next section examines a variety of robustness checks.
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Table 4.1: Results - Industry Average Team Size
Dependent variable:
Tariﬀ
(1) (2) (3)
Specialization Sit −0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.0024∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Import Competition Pit −0.038∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.0425∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.0054)
Sit ∗ Pit 0.005∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0015)
Controls:
Trade Costs 0.121∗∗∗
(0.044)
Intra-Industry Trade 0.003
(0.003)
Total Factor Productivity −0.009∗∗
(0.004)
ΔTFP −0.001
(0.006)
Employment 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00005)
Pay Roll −6.81e-06∗∗∗
(1.76e-06)
Investment 8.79e-06∗∗∗
(2.64e-06)
Constant 0.025∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Observations 7,263 7,263 7,193
Adjusted R2 0.762 0.763 0.773
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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In Figure 4.3, the marginal eﬀect of specialization is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant when import penetration is lower than approximately 0.35 and positive
and statistically signiﬁcant above approximately 0.80. These results support H3
(the negative eﬀect case vs no eﬀect). The marginal eﬀect of import penetration is
negative and statistically signiﬁcant when specialization is lower than approximately
7 and positive and statistically signiﬁcant above approximately 13 at 90% conﬁdence,
and at 95% conﬁdence above approximately 15. These marginal eﬀects support H4.
Figure 4.3: Marginal Eﬀect of Specializa-
tion on Tariﬀs
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Figure 4.4: Marginal Eﬀect of Import
Penetration on Tariﬀs
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4.3.3 Robustness Checks
4.3.3.1 Endogeneity Considerations
There is some cause to be concerned with potential endogeneity between within
industry specialization and tariﬀ rates. Better protected industries from tariﬀs po-
tentially have greater ability to invest in new technologies. This concern luckily has
little support empirically. Table 4.2 shows the results from three additional models
where within industry specialization is lagged one period, ﬁve periods and ten pe-
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riods into the past. The results hold, and are in fact larger in magnitude for t − 1
and t − 5. However, not for t − 10.7 Additionally, the concern about endogeneity
between greater investment in R&D and within industry specialization are not the-
oretically consistent or sound with what is presented in this dissertation. There is
no guarentee that an industry will invest in more innovations if they are protected.
In fact, the conventional wisdom is that the reason industries are protected to begin
with is that they are not innovative enough on their own. This is the argument made
as to why Latin American import substitution and industrialization policies failed.
The protected industries were simply unable to become innovative enough. Either
it was too diﬃcult to catch up to the developed economies or protection discourages
innovation the way open competition does. Lastly, and most importantly the idea
that more innovation leads to more within industry specialization is not a guaran-
tee. While the results do show some similarities between the results from the patent
team size models are similar to the results from patent stock and ﬁlings, there is no
theoretical support that the two necessarily measure complexity of knowledge within
an industry. For example, consider an industry that creates 1000 innovations in a
particular year. Compare this to another industry that only creates 10 innovations
the same year. Which industry has a greater complexity of knowledge? That is,
which industry has a greater need for within industry specialization? You cannot
tell from just knowing the number of innovations. The important contribution of this
dissertation is that you can proxy for complexity by looking at the number of team
members are required for innovation. The greater the team size, the more complexity
is inherent in the body of knowledge. The 1000 innovation industry may average one
team member per innovation while the 10 innovation industry may average ten.
7I only show the results from the more comprehensive model including controls, but the parsi-
monious models with only the main independent variables of interest are in line with the models
reported in the prior section.
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Table 4.2: Results - Lagged Within Industry Specialization
Dependent variable:
Tariﬀ
(1) (2) (3)
t− 1 t− 5 t− 10
Specialization Si −0.0020∗∗∗ −0.0014∗∗∗ −0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Import Penetration Pi −0.0945∗∗∗ −0.0891∗∗∗ −0.0278∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0163) (0.0135)
Si ∗ Pi 0.00535∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.0011
(0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0026)
Controls:
Trade Costs 0.1238∗∗∗ 0.1388∗∗∗ 0.1665∗∗∗
(0.0438) (0.0341) (0.0354)
Intra-Industry Trade −0.0019∗∗∗ −0.0006 −0.0063
(0.0138) (0.0030) (0.0037)
Total Factor Productivity −0.0172∗∗∗ −0.0167∗∗∗ −0.0080∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0005)
ΔTFP 0.0068 0.0099∗∗ −0.0167∗∗∗
(0.0056) (0.0049) (0.0050)
Employment −0.0001∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00006)
Pay Roll −0.000006∗∗∗ −0.000007∗∗∗ 0.000007∗∗
(0.00001) (0.000002)∗∗∗ (0.000002)
Investment 0.00008∗∗∗ 0.000008 0.000005∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.000003) (0.000002)
Constant 0.07516∗∗∗ 0.0724∗∗∗ 0.0524∗∗∗
(0.0071) (0.0066) (0.0055)
Observations 6212 4915 3310
Adjusted R2 0.82 0.85 0.87
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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4.3.3.2 Alternative Speciﬁcations of Specialization
To check whether or not average team size is a good characterization of within in-
dustry specialization and potential inﬂuence of outliers, I test a number of additional
versions of this variable. I create additional measures of the Minimum, Maximum,
and Median industry year team sizes. It could be that is not the average team size
but the stock of knowledge in an industry that matters. Therefore, I also use the
number of patents ﬁled in an industry year and the cumulative stock of patents in
an industry. However, this does not directly ﬂow from the theory presented in this
dissertation. I examined this implication further in the preceding section on endo-
geneity. To summarize, increasing the number of innovations does not necessarily
increase complexity (within industry specialization).
The summary statistics and correlations are presented in Table 4.3 and Table
4.4. While the number of patents ﬁled and total stock of patents are not highly
correlated with the average, minimum, maximum or median, the model results are
all fairly consistent and similar to the original model. These results are summarized
in Tables 4.5 through 4.9. Their respective marginal eﬀects are visualized in Figures
4.5 through 4.14. The direction of the coeﬃcient estimates are consistent through-
out, negative for both the main eﬀect of specialization and import penetration, and
positive for the interaction. Only in the minimum team size is the interaction not
signiﬁcant. However, the interaction still has an eﬀect that is consistent with prior
ﬁndings when looking at the marginal eﬀects plots.
The fact that import penetration is negative is theoretically irksome. The neg-
ative sign is quite robust. Other speciﬁcations show it is curvilinear, as a squared
term. The ﬁnding that it changes directions under an interaction with within indus-
try specialization is also robust. However, the curvilinear eﬀect suggests that many
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industries with large import penetrations are already “dying” industries which have
had their barriers reduced. Once you get past the inﬂection point of the curve, the
import penetration variable has the theoretically expected eﬀect. Increased import
penetration increases tariﬀ rates.
Additionally, in the number of patents ﬁled per year model, the main eﬀect of
specialization and the interaction are not signiﬁcant. However, the marginal eﬀects
plots, Figure 4.11 show that the eﬀect of specialization is signiﬁcant at high levels of
import penetration and almost signiﬁcant at a 90% conﬁdence interval when import
penetration is really low. Also, for the same model the marginal eﬀect of import
penetration in Figure 4.12 is negative and signiﬁcant when specialization is low, and
positive and signiﬁcant when specialization is moderately high. The same pattern
holds for the total stock of patents in an industry but much more signiﬁcant. Overall
the patterns in these models are very consistent with the original measurement of
within industry specialization using average team size.
Table 4.3: Alternative Speciﬁcations of Specialization Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Minimum 58056 1.26 0.76 1 14
Maximum 58056 3.31 2.16 1 19
Median 58056 1.68 0.914 1 14
# Patents Filed 58056 8.38 24.44 1 434
Stock 58056 95.51 333.33 1 4901
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Table 4.4: Alternative Speciﬁcations of Specialization Correlation Table
Variables Average Minimum Maximum Median # Patents Stock
Average 1.000
Minimum 0.755 1.000
Maximum 0.431 0.031 1.000
Median 0.922 0.796 0.232 1.000
# Patents 0.024 -0.035 0.433 0.002 1.000
Stock 0.029 -0.032 0.408 0.010 0.956 1.000
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Table 4.5: Results - Industry Minimum Team Size
Dependent variable:
Tariﬀ
(1) (2) (3)
Specialization Sit −0.0012∗∗ −0.0016∗∗∗ −0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Import Penetration Pit −0.0389∗∗∗ −0.0413∗∗∗ −0.0349∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0032)
Sit ∗ Pit 0.0019 0.0013
(0.0012) (0.0012)
Controls:
Trade Costs 0.121∗∗∗
(0.044)
Intra-Industry Trade 0.003
(0.003)
Total Factor Productivity −0.009∗∗
(0.004)
ΔTFP −0.001
(0.006)
Employment 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00005)
Pay Roll −7.09e-06∗∗∗
(1.78e-06)
Investment 9.00e-06∗∗∗
(2.68e-06)
Constant 0.0596∗∗∗ 0.0602∗∗∗ 0.0573∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0087) (0.006)
Observations 7,263 7,263 7,193
Adjusted R2 0.761 0.762 0.773
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.6: Results - Industry Maximum Team Size
Dependent variable:
Tariﬀ
(1) (2) (3)
Specialization Sit −0.0079∗∗∗ −0.0012∗∗∗ −0.0011∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Import Penetration Pit −0.0377∗∗∗ −0.0455∗∗∗ −0.0407∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0055) (0.0057)
Sit ∗ Pit 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0020∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Controls:
Trade Costs 0.120∗∗∗
(0.0437)
Intra-Industry Trade 0.0036
(0.0032)
Total Factor Productivity −0.0089∗∗
(0.0042)
ΔTFP −0.0017
(0.0061)
Employment 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00006)
Pay Roll −6.92e-06∗∗∗
(1.76e-06)
Investment 8.77e-06∗∗∗
(2.63e-06)
Constant 0.0605∗∗∗ 0.0622∗∗∗ 0.0589∗∗∗
(0.0068) (0.0011) (0.0056)
Observations 7,263 7,263 7,193
Adjusted R2 0.762 0.763 0.773
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.7: Results - Industry Median Team Size
Dependent variable:
Tariﬀ
(1) (2) (3)
Specialization Sit −0.0014∗∗∗ −0.0022∗∗∗ −0.0017∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Import Penetration Pit −0.0384∗∗∗ −0.0448∗∗∗ −0.0387∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0040)
Sit ∗ Pit 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0011)
Controls:
Trade Costs 0.121∗∗∗
(0.044)
Intra-Industry Trade 0.003
(0.003)
Total Factor Productivity −0.009∗∗
(0.004)
ΔTFP −0.001
(0.006)
Employment 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00005)
Pay Roll −6.91e-06∗∗∗
(1.77e-06)
Investment 8.88e-06∗∗∗
(2.65e-06)
Constant 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0618∗∗∗ 0.0584∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.001) (0.006)
Observations 7,263 7,263 7,193
Adjusted R2 0.762 0.762 0.773
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.8: Results - Number of Patents Filed Per Industry Year
Dependent variable:
Tariﬀ
(1) (2) (3)
Specialization Sit −0.00003 −0.00002 −0.00023
(0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00006)
Import Penetration Pit −0.0388∗∗∗ −0.0383∗∗∗ −0.0328∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0031)
Sit ∗ Pit 0.00005 0.00004
(0.00004) (0.00005)
Controls:
Trade Costs 0.121∗∗∗
(0.044)
Intra-Industry Trade 0.003
(0.003)
Total Factor Productivity −0.009∗∗
(0.004)
ΔTFP −0.001
(0.006)
Employment 0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00005)
Pay Roll −7.11e-06∗∗∗
(1.78e-06)
Investment 9.03e-06∗∗∗
(2.68e-06)
Constant 0.0584∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.0556∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.007) (0.0056)
Observations 7,263 7,263 7,193
Adjusted R2 0.761 0.761 0.772
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.9: Results - Industry Total Stock of Patents
Dependent variable:
Tariﬀ
(1) (2) (3)
Specialization Sit −0.00002∗∗∗ −0.00002∗∗∗ −0.00002∗∗∗
(4.39e-06) (6.89e-06) (5.97e-06)
Import Penetration Pit −0.0367∗∗∗ −0.0380∗∗∗ −0.03321∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0030)
Sit ∗ Pit 0.00001∗∗∗ 8.89e-06∗∗∗
(4.11e-06) (3.40e-06)
Controls:
Trade Costs 0.119∗∗∗
(0.043)
Intra-Industry Trade 0.004
(0.003)
Total Factor Productivity −0.009∗∗
(0.004)
ΔTFP −0.001
(0.006)
Employment 0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00006)
Pay Roll −5.83e-06∗∗∗
(1.69e-06)
Investment 7.91e-06∗∗∗
(2.58e-06)
Constant 0.0592∗∗∗ 0.0599∗∗∗ 0.0561∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.006)
Observations 7,263 7,263 7,193
Adjusted R2 0.764 0.765 0.774
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 4.5: Marginal Eﬀect of Specializa-
tion (Minimum)
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Figure 4.6: Marginal Eﬀect of Import
Penetration (Minimum)
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Figure 4.7: Marginal Eﬀect of Specializa-
tion (Maximum)
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Figure 4.8: Marginal Eﬀect of Import
Penetration (Maximum)
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Figure 4.9: Marginal Eﬀect of Specializa-
tion (Median)
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Figure 4.10: Marginal Eﬀect of Import
Penetration (Median)
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Figure 4.11: Marginal Eﬀect of Special-
ization (#Patents Filed)
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Figure 4.12: Marginal Eﬀect of Import
Penetration (#Patents Filed)
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Figure 4.13: Marginal Eﬀect of Special-
ization (Stock)
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Figure 4.14: Marginal Eﬀect of Import
Penetration (Stock)
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4.3.3.3 Those Most Exposed to Imports
Much of the theory proposed in this dissertation focuses on how actors will behave
when exposed to foreign competition. However, many industries are characterized
by high intra-industry trade. That is, there is high trade overlap within the same
industries–trading cars for cars. Much of world trade between developed economies
is of this type. These types of industries may have large levels of imports but also
large levels of exports. The patterns of intra-industry trade are governed by scale
economies, product diﬀerentiation, and consumer love of variety. These industries
likely have diﬀerent preferences on trade barriers than true import competing indus-
tries. While, intra-industry trade levels are controlled for in the models, there are
other ways these industries might be depressing my results. To tackle which indus-
tries my theory is most relevant to, I employ two ways of identifying them. First, I
to split the sample into four quadrants of industry “types.” The other is to utilize a
“modiﬁed” Grubel-Lloyed index of trade overlap / intra industry trade.
Those with high exports and little imports as those competitively advantaged.
Those industries with high exports and high imports are characterized by intra-
industry trade. Those with little imports and exports are either low intra-industry
trade or mostly non-tradables. And ﬁnally, those of interest to this dissertation
are those with high imports but few exports. These four types are displayed in
the scatter plot presented in Figure 4.15. The horizontal and vertical lines show
the cutoﬀ points chosen to split the sample of industries along exports and import
penetration. For both dimensions I set the cutoﬀ points at their respective 90th
percentiles. This leaves those industries that are both in the highest ten percent
of import penetration and lowest ten percent of exports. If the high intra-industry
trade industries are depressing the results, we should observe “stronger” eﬀects by
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omitting them.
Figure 4.15: Targeting the Most Exposed
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The marginal eﬀects of specialization and import penetration are visualized in
Figure 4.18 and Figure 4.19 respectively. At ﬁrst glance the marginal eﬀect of spe-
cialization when import penetration is low seems closer to zero, thus less signiﬁ-
cant. However, it is not, as the magnitude of the marginal eﬀect is about ﬁve times
larger than the whole sample models estimated before. The same holds true for the
marginal eﬀect of import penetration. Again, however, the eﬀect is only positive and
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signiﬁcant with a one tailed test at very high values of specialization.
Figure 4.16: Marginal Eﬀect of Special-
ization (Most Exposed Sample)
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Figure 4.17: Marginal Eﬀect of Import
Penetration (Most Exposed Sample)
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The other method, utilizing a modiﬁed Grubel-Lloyed index anchors high ex-
port industries at one end of the index, high import industries at the other, and
is centered with those with high overlap. A this index is calculated as IITmit =
Exportsit−Importsit
Exportsit+Importsit
. This “unwraps” the standard Grubel-Lloyed index so that a value
of -1 denotes only exports, 0 is only intra-industry trade, and 1 is only imports.
The pattern of the standard Grubel-Lloyed suggests that since 1976, the average
level of intra-industry trade in my sample of industries has actually been on a de-
cline in the United States. From the modiﬁed Grubel-Lloyed index, one can see
that intra-industry trade has been declining due to an increase in imports as a share
of trade (448 4-digit SIC industries, over 34 years). This increase in imports in
the trade balance matches other observations in the literature (Baldwin 2011). To
split the sample, I cut oﬀ industry that does not have suﬃcient level of imports at
IITmit = 0.5.
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Figure 4.18: Marginal Eﬀect of Special-
ization (Grubel-Lloyed Index)
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Figure 4.19: Marginal Eﬀect of Import
Penetration (Grubel-Lloyed Index)
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The results of this model are presented as just the marginal eﬀects. These are
visualized in Figure 4.18 and Figure 4.19. The pattern of results is similar and
slightly larger in size to those of the whole sample estimated at the beginning of
this section. Overall, the results of these two models estimated on those particularly
highly exposed to imports suggest that the eﬀects of the two variables are strongest
among the most threatened by imports.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
The results are promising. This chapter tests the eﬀects of within industry spe-
cialization on trade policy outcomes. There are two important conclusions are drawn
from this chapter in regards to the importance of collective action problems on pol-
icy outcomes. First, the empirical results reaﬃrm my theory’s assumptions around
industry entry/exit cost (factor mobility) heterogeneity and collective action. This
supports the intuition behind some earlier work by Alt. et al (1999) who look at
individual self-reported asset speciﬁcity and lobbing for subsidies in Norway. The
cost of entrance and exit for one particular industry is not necessarily the same as
another industry’s. This means that there are heterogenous expectations on eco-
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nomic actors being able to overcome collective action problems within a particular
industry. In trade politics we would expect that import competing industries to have
higher tariﬀ rates across the board. The analysis here suggests otherwise. The re-
sults emphasize the need to analyze collective action problems, not just the economic
interests of industries (Alt et al. 1996). I ﬁnd that industries that face high import
competition must be able to overcome collective action problems to have their voice
heard in political negotiations over the tariﬀ (Alt and Gilligan 1994). Otherwise,
these industries are potentially sacriﬁced politically in trade deals.
The second conclusion drawn from this chapter is that industries that are unable
to overcome collective action problems are eﬀectively thrown under the bus. That is,
in Hypothesis 3, I have two diﬀerent expectations for when within industry special-
ization is low. In this case, industry membership does not matter, competitors can
crowd into the industry, leaving the industry is cheap, and collective action problems
exist.
Two expectations can be envisioned for trade policy outcomes in this industry.
One expectation is that (1) import competition has no eﬀect on trade barriers in
this industry because actors cannot (or do not even want to) act collectively to
increase barriers. This expectation follows the traditional view of trade preferences–
actors want protection when facing (foreign) competition. The other expectation is
(2) that import competition actually decreases trade barriers in an industry as the
industry is essentially allowed to die oﬀ in order to get cheaper imports from more
eﬃcient foreign producers and to gain reciprocal reductions abroad. The evidence
here strongly supports this negative eﬀect on trade barriers. Not only are these
industries unable to get protection, they actually have declines in tariﬀ rates. This is
exactly what happened time and time again to the textile industry since the 1950’s.
I cover textile’s decline in the next chapter. This conclusion also reemphasizes the
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importance of economic factors (here, technology) on group cohesiveness and ability
to overcome collective action problems when we try to study political outcomes (See
Alt et al. 1996, Alt and Gilligan 1994).
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5. CONCLUSION
5.1 Autos and Textiles
The continued downfall of textiles in the United States initially seems contrary
to the axiom taught to undergraduates every yearthe beneﬁts of protection are con-
centrated and the costs diﬀuse.1 Are the beneﬁts of protectionist policy targeting
textiles beneﬁcial only to textiles? That is, can workers in the textile industry exclude
workers in other industries from receiving the higher income due to trade barriers?
Everything in this dissertation points to no. An industry with low barriers to en-
try/exit, such as my measurement of within-industry specialization, will not be able
to hold on to any industry speciﬁc rents as competitors crowd into the industry and
prices equalize. The beneﬁts of protection are diﬀuse. This discourages industry
speciﬁc intensity and cohesiveness of lobbying.
The major decline of the textile industry came in the 1980s. The industry lobby
was by now much less inﬂuential than it was just post-WW2 (Minchin 2013, pg. 45-).
Time and time again the industry lost major legislative and diplomatic battles over
beneﬁcial protectionist policy. In 1970, after a protectionist bill died in the senate,
Nixon tried to placate the textile industry with negotiated quotas with Japana major
exporter of textiles at the time to the United States. These quotas, however, were
largely ineﬀective. They allowed 5% annual increases to exports to the United States
and were subject to change on Japan’s whim (Minchin 2013, pg. 60). Another bill
was passed in 1978 to prevent textile tariﬀ cuts, but was vetoed by President Carter
(Minchin 2013, pg. 67). These losses led to, “The Most Important Battle”, the
Textile and Apparel Trade Enforcement Act of 1985 (H.R. 1562) to get passed by
1And the reverse, the costs of free trade are concentrated and the beneﬁts diﬀuse. Citing
marginal beneﬁts and collective action theories, this phrase is at the core of how political scientists
and economists answer “if free trade is always beneﬁcial to a country as a whole, why do we ever
have protectionism?”
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the legislature (Minchin 2013, pg. 117). It was vetoed by President Reagan, and
the attempt to override the veto failed. The political losses continued to build with
future failures for similar bills in 1987 and 1990 (Minchin 2013, pg. 149-).
Given the relatively low capital, low complexity, and low skilled labor requiring
only general easily transferable skills, the textile industry is in a peculiar situation.
The fact that factors of production can cheaply move in and out of the textile indus-
try, reduces how much a factor of production cares about being employed in textiles
relative to any other industry. I am not saying labor and capital and completely
costlessly move to another industry. The initial investment in ﬁxed costs is relatively
lower than building, say, a full scale automobile plant. And the intensity of lobbying
and industry cohesiveness will be proportional to that in addition to entry and exit
costs. Eﬀectively, textiles exist in a phase closer to a Heckscher-Ohlin mobile factors
world than a Ricardo-Viner speciﬁc factors world. This makes collective action on
behalf of the industry less beneﬁcial, while potentially increasing the beneﬁt of col-
lective action on behalf of the factor of production. Again, a relatively unexplored
implication of this theory is that both Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner “type”
industries exist simultaneously in an economy during the same time period. Other
work has varied factor mobility either across time (Hiscox 2001) or across countries
(Hiscox 2001, Mukherjee et al. 2009).2
Of course, adding to the complexity of understanding collective action problems
and free riding, the number of all the owners of a factor in a whole economy is larger
than those employed in a single industry. This is not a major concern in my theory
as I am comparing lobbying levels between those industries closer to the speciﬁc
2Only one paper allows mobility to vary by unit. Alt et al. 1999 use R&D intensity and job
immobility to measure asset speciﬁcity of ﬁrms. However, the authors use a subjective measure
and do not explore the greater implications to our understanding of market dynamics and political
action.
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factors world relative to those closer to a mobile factors world. I am not comparing
the lobbying eﬀorts of industry versus factor.
The automobile industry did not face the same fate as textiles for a number of
reasons. I emphasize one in particular in this dissertation, high entry and exit bar-
riers. Some of these barriers are due to high scale economies/ﬁxed costs but also
associated with the inherent nature of the automobile industry to develop techno-
logical complexity. This same complexity helped protect the industry as a natural
barrier to entry just like the traditional ﬁxed costse.g. factories, machines, buildings.
However, technological complexity also necessitated higher levels of industry spe-
ciﬁc specialization. If an investor is considering buying a number of machines that
can only be used in the production of cars, that investor will care a lot about the
auto industry than an investor purchasing machines that can be used in a number
of industries. I surmise that high levels of within industry specialization increase
the intensity of which actors in a particular industry care about the industry itself,
decrease collective action problems more generally thus increasing lobbying expen-
ditures, and ultimately interact with import competition to increase the likelihood
of a favorable trade policy outcome.
Admittedly, the automobile industry example I have been uses relies heavily on a
non-trade policy measurebailout. The theory more generally does not necessitate a
speciﬁc type of policy area, just an industry speciﬁc policy. If it is an industry-wide
bailout or an industry-wide tariﬀ, the theory applies. However, what do tariﬀ rates
of the automobile industry look like in comparison to textiles?3 Figure 5.1 shows the
tariﬀ rate between the two. The tariﬀ rate for textiles has taken a nose dive during
this time period while the automobile industry’s has state relatively stable. If we
3As noted before, textiles is actually a very broad group of diﬀerent 4-digit SIC textile-like
industries ranging from ﬂip ﬂop foot ware to cotton gin to apparel. While automobile manufacturing
ﬁts much more neatly into a single 4-digit SIC category.
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were to take into account quotas and voluntary export restraints, both industries’
protection would be even higher. Even so, non-tariﬀ barriers have not replaced tariﬀs
for textiles. The industry is simply becoming less and less protected by trade policy.
Figure 5.1: Auto and Textile Tariﬀs
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5.2 Concluding Remarks
5.2.1 Limitations and Future Research
There are many additional observable implications of within industry specializa-
tion that have not been in the scope of this dissertation but are viable avenues to be
pursued. First, is WIS’s eﬀect on geographical agglomeration of an industry. The
textile industry was relatively geographically diﬀuse compared to automobiles. “We
have no Detroits or Pittsburghs. This makes our job harder.”4 I would argue that
part of the geographical concentration of the auto industry is driven by the inher-
ent complexity requiring teamwork and closer communication linkages. It has been
shown that complex industrial technology increases clustering of ﬁrms (Porter 1998),
therefore, industry level specialization can inﬂuence geographic concentration, or in-
dustrial agglomeration of ﬁrms in a particular industry. It is advantageous for ﬁrms
within the same industry to be spatially proximate to each other for the diﬀusion of
specialized knowledge through face-to-face interaction. As specialization necessitates
larger team sizes in patent development, it can have the same eﬀect on the demand
for specialized labor, collaboration in the supply chain, and other inter-ﬁrm linkages.
We would expect industries with higher specialization, therefore, to be more likely to
geographically cluster near each other. This would further magnify the eﬀect found
by Busch and Reinhardt (2000) that geographically concentrated industries are more
likely to lobby for protection.5
Second, is a more complete evaluation of the validity of within industry special-
ization as entry and exit costs. I believe Jones (2009) and the research his paper
spawned in innovation economics already answered the validity of patent team sizes
4John Leslie, Textile Consultant to General Executive Board of the Amalgamated Clothing and
Textile Workers Union in 1986. Cited from Minchin (2013, pg 3).
5See McGillvray (1997) and Busch and Reinhardt (2000) for earlier work on this topic. Addi-
tionally, Rickard (2012) expands this to factor in the eﬀect of electoral institutions.
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as a good measure of a body of knowledge’s complexity. However, more could be
expanded from this dissertation’s use of team size as a measurement of one aspect of
entry and exit costs–those associated with the need to specialize in industry speciﬁc
knowledge/use. A number of alternative measures of specialization exist already.
The NBER patent data used here additionally oﬀers alternative measurements that
could be used as proxies for the theoretical measurement of specialization discussed
here. Generality, for example, measures the percentage of citations received by a
patent in the same patent class. A high generality score means widespread impact
on subsequent innovations in a variety of ﬁelds. While, originality, measures the
relative amount of citations a patent receives itself. A high originality score means
a patent cites a narrow set of technologies. Lastly, each patent lists a number of
claims for which it has uses. This is to specify in detail the building block com-
ponents and may be indicative of scope or width (Trajtenberg et al. 1997; Hall et
al. 2001). These three measurements can potentially substitute for the conceptu-
alization of within industry specialization as complexity of technology/knowledge
presented here.
There are a number of empirical limitations that could be improved on in future
research. For example, what is the most valid approach to determine the trade
policy preference of an industry? Revealed Comparative Advantage (Balassa 1965)
could be used instead of import values and penetration. The revealed comparative
advantage metric captures a countries propensity to export in a particular industry
relative to the rest of the worlds propensity to export in the same industry. Also, the
analysis has focused on politically transparent trade barriers, such as the tariﬀ rate.
In the future, the analysis should take into account the potential for obfuscation of
trade barriers behind less transparent measures such as quality regulations (Kono
2006; Rickard 2012). To continue testing the theory, it will be interesting to examine
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actual industry and ﬁrm lobbying such ﬁling complaints with the International Trade
Commission (Gilligan 1997), as well as the voter turnout and preferences of individual
laborers (Busch and Reinhardt 2000).
5.2.2 Contributions and Implications
This dissertation builds oﬀ prior work in many areas. I link together theories of
factor mobility, collective action, scale economies, innovation economics, and inter-
national trade. This dissertation fulﬁlls ultimately two functions. First, it integrates
existing established theories to paint a more realistic picture of the landscape be-
tween the interaction of politics and economics. Second, this dissertation oﬀers an
empirical test of not only within industry specialization but also contributes to the
foundational theories it is derived from. The empirical results here can be shown as
continued support for the importance of taking into account group level collective
action problems when studying policy outcomes for a group.
What should a policy maker take away from this dissertation? Technological
development does not always increase factor mobility. In fact, there is increasing
evidence that at least right now; factor mobility is declining in the United States.
And it is declining at a more rapid rate in technologically innovative industries.
What are the implications of decreased mobility on policy outcomes? The lack of
mobility has been widely associated with higher economic risk (Iversen and Soskice
2001) leading to higher levels of protectionism (Mukherjee et al. 2009).
Ultimately, the policy prescription depends on the goals of the policy maker. Is
reducing economic anxieties from import competition and/or factor immobility a
primary concern? Then the solution is two fold. The ﬁrst is commonly proposed:
increase funding for trade adjustment assistance and career retraining programs.
The second, though seemingly related, is a new implication from within industry
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specialization. Recall that technology can decrease mobility as I argued here, but
can also increase mobility like it has done so in the past. Now and in the future, the
body of knowledge in every ﬁeld is going to become ever greater in depth and breadth.
For labor, the limitation is on us. Humans have biological information processing
limitations. We can only learn so much in so little time, let alone process all of it.
Smart information technologies that help us collate and recall relevant information
will decrease the reliance on industry speciﬁc knowledge. A policy maker in this
case should focus public money and policy on increasing information collection and
retrieval technologies.
For capital, a cycle of rapid experimentation and divergence is currently occur-
ring. New technologies are invented left and right to solve many real and some made
up problems. I believe as technology continues to evolve, the role of the policy maker
should be to encourage industry and cross-industry standardization. Either through
government intervention or industry self-enforcement. For many automated tasks, a
robotic arm that produces cars could very well be used to assemble smart phones or
even ﬂip hamburgers. In the robotic arm example, if the technology becomes cheap
enough and ﬂexible enough it becomes usable in a broader range of industries.
What about social scientists? The within industry specialization measure de-
scribed and its eﬀects on market structures are important factors to study as they
inﬂuence political outcomes. The main take home point of this dissertation for social
scientists is twofold. First, industry speciﬁc entry and exit cost matter in determin-
ing industry cohesiveness and intensity to act on a political issue that aﬀects the
industry. Second, technological development can in fact decrease mobility of fac-
tors of production. This decline in mobility, due to specialized use to a particular
industry, increases how much the industry matters for a factor of production. The
second point is the same conclusion drawn from research utilizing the speciﬁc factors
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(Ricardo-Viner) model of trade to predict political coalitions and preferences but
with the innovation of industry speciﬁc entry and exit costs. The conclusion is that
actors within some industries will care about their industry of membership, while
others within the same economy and time will not.
This dissertation examined a single facet of these broader implicationstrade pol-
icy. An industry’s capability to get and the preference for industry speciﬁc protection
depend–at least partially–on an industry’s technological complexity. I developed a
multifaceted theory of “within industry specialization” that borrows from the con-
tributions from recent developments in the innovation economics literature. I link
these contributions to well established theories in economies of scale, trade politics,
and collective action.
An interesting contribution of the theory is that technology does not always
increase factor mobility. As traditionally understood in the literature technological
innovations can both increase productivity/eﬃciency and decrease transaction costs
(communications and transportation). However, I point out that technology has
another forgotten dimension, complexity. This complexity necessitates that factors
of production, with labor being the simplest example, to specialize in increasingly
narrow subsets of tasks and knowledge. Some of this knowledge and asks will be
industry speciﬁc. Once invested in, cannot be utilized in other industries. Of course,
certain types of innovations can reverse this trend by making information more easily
accessible across bodies of knowledge or more standardized. However, I argue that
these are few and far between. In the present day of technological development and
complexity, each body of knowledge associated with particular industries is very deep
and broad. So much so, that non-transferable skills and knowledge relatively, as a
proportion of the whole, outnumber the transferable ones.
Lastly, within industry specialization has important implications for oﬀshoring
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and outsourcing. The increased need for specialization is driven by the complexity
of tasks necessary to produce new innovations and knowledge. Tasks done, can be
thought of exactly in the same way Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg describe in their
“trade in tasks theory of oﬀshoring (2006). This leads to two competing predic-
tions. The ﬁrst prediction is that the complexity prevents oﬀshoring because tasks
are too diﬃcult (too high tech) to be done elsewhere and/or the necessity of network
eﬀects and face-to-face communication necessitate tasks to be done proximately to
each other. This was described by Busch and Reinhardt (2000) as to why industries
concentrate geographically. The second prediction has the opposite eﬀect. The ad-
ditional complexity, which increases team sizes, introduces potential for more tasks
to be introduced into production methods and innovation. These additional tasks
can then be moved outside of the ﬁrm (outsourced) or country (oﬀshored). These
two possibilities do not make my theory less relevant, they deﬁnitely make it more
relevant and provide testable implications for future research. Testing these impli-
cations is right now outside of the scope of the dissertation, which I focus only on
the theories implications of collective action and trade protection.
The empirical chapters in this dissertation examined how technological specializa-
tion, conditional on the level of foreign competition, aﬀects the ability and intensity
of industry lobbying. The results show the importance that individual industry
market structures have on the amount of political lobbying and political outcomes
(trade protection). The answer to the question raised in Chapter 2, “when facing
foreign competition, why do some industries receive trade protection while others
do not?”, lies with within industry specialization. When specialization is high, and
competition is high, industries will lobby more intensely than those with low spe-
cialization and/or low competition. And these industries are more likely to receive
trade protection than their counterparts.
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APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTIVES
A.1 Tables
Table A.1: SIC-87 2-digit Industries
SIC Major groups: (2-digit level)
20: Food and Kindred Products
21: Tobacco Products
22: Textile Mill Products
23: Apparel and other Finished Products made from Fabrics and similar materials
24: Lumber and Wood Products, except Furniture
25: Furniture and Fixtures
26: Paper and Allied Products
27: Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries
28: Chemicals and Allied Products
29: Petroleum Reﬁning and Related Industries
30: Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products
31: Leather and Leather Products
32: Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products
33: Primary Metal Industries
34: Fabricated Metal Products, except Machinery and Transportation Equipment
35: Industrial and Commercial Machinery, and Computer Equipment
36: Electronic and other Electrical Equipment, except Computer Equipment
37: Transportation Equipment
38: Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments
(Photographic, Medical and Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks)
39: Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries
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A.2 Figures
Annual box plots for both the standard Grubel-Lloyed index and the “unwrapped”
version are reported in Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 respectively. The pattern in Figure
A.1 suggests that since 1976, the average level of intra-industry trade has actually
been on a decline in the United States. In Figure A.2 we can see that intra-industry
trade has been declining due to an increase in imports as a share of trade (448 4-
digit SIC industries, over 34 years). This increase in imports in the trade balance
matches other observations in the literature (Baldwin 2011). Additionally, these box
plots highlight only the economy wide averages, and not individual industry levels
of intra-industry trade.
Figure A.1: Grubel-Lloyed Index
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Figure A.2: Modiﬁed Grubel-Lloyed Index
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